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Abstract
This dissertation focuses ultimately on the topic of evolution, which is the foundation of modern biology.
I hope to understand, in a general sense, evolution on a population scale by investigating individual level
interactions.
In this dissertation, I present four projects in biophysics performed under the supervision of Professor
Nigel Goldenfeld: Population dynamics of viruses and their hosts, game theory and the social life of micro-
organisms, a novel mechanism enhancing cooperation in evolutionary game theory, and evolutionary robust
strategies for delivery of antibiotics.
In the first project, starting with stochastic rate equations for the fundamental interactions between
microbes and their viruses, we derive a mean-field theory for the population dynamics of microbe-virus
systems, including the e↵ects of lysogeny. In the absence of lysogeny, our model is a generalization of that
proposed phenomenologically by Weitz and Dusho↵. In the presence of lysogeny, we analyze the possible
states of the system, identifying a novel limit cycle, which we interpret physically. To test the robustness
of our mean field calculations to demographic fluctuations, we have compared our results with stochastic
simulations using the Gillespie algorithm. Finally, we estimate the range of parameters that delineate the
various steady states of our model.
In the second project, we present a mean field model for the phase diagram of a community of micro-
organisms, interacting through their metabolism so that they are, in e↵ect, engaging in a cooperative social
game. We show that as a function of the concentration of the nutrients glucose and histidine, the community
undergoes a phase transition separating a state in which one strain is dominant to a state which is char-
acterized by coexisting populations. Our results are in good agreement with recent experimental results,
correctly reproducing quantitative trends and predicting the phase diagram.
In the third project, we propose a novel mechanism to enhance cooperation in evolutionary game theory.
Explicitly incorporating stochasticity in the phenotypic decision making process, and the interaction between
evolution and ecology in the dynamic landscape, we demonstrate that for a wide variety of cooperative games
of the prisoner’s dilemma type, cooperation eventually becomes the dominant strategy as long as the rules
ii
are permitted to evolve in response to the changing environment. Therefore, the ubiquitously observed
cooperation in nature may come from stochastic phenotype and evolutionary landscape rather than the
detailed type of competition. Altruism becomes an advantageous strategy, because it avoids being exploited
by selfish agents.
In the last project, we treat antibiotic resistance, which is a major concern in public health. Compared
with conventional antibiotics, we show that the emergence of antibiotic resistance can be significantly de-
layed by using narrow and ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics to target pathogens, rather than the entire
microbiome. We also develop a new strategy that involves spoofing quorum sensing channels of commu-
nication, causing premature expression of virulence factors. When combined with ultra-narrow spectrum
antibiotics, our strategy removes infections and most importantly does not lead to the emergence and spread
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Approximately five centuries ago, Nicholas Copernicus (1473 - 1543) famously dragged the Earth away from
its holy position as the center of the entire universe. Worshipping and pursuing elegance and brevity, he put
the Earth revolving around the Sun together with other planets, discarding Claudius Ptolemaeus’s exquisite
and complex design of epicycles on epicycles. Although the heliocentric model was still a naive infant, a
historic revolution was launched. When the Earth was no longer so special as humans had imagined, why
should the Sun be that special or even the Milky Way galaxy? Today, the once sacred Earth ends up to be
a most ordinary planet at a brim far, far away from the center of the universe.
Two hundred years ago, another revolution began, this time in biology. Charles R. Darwin (1809 -
1882) and Alfred R. Wallace (1823 - 1913) mercilessly dragged humans away from their holy position at
the center of all life. Attached to a history of evolution longer than any human record, Homo sapiens too
has evolved from other species while mountains elevate and flatten. Carl Woese completed the indignity
visited upon humans when he unveiled the phylogeny of life, placing humans at the periphery of a huge
three-domained tree, composed mostly of microbes. While admitting that humans were not that special, we
again were astonished when the human genome was mapped out in 2001. Instead of a previous estimation
of about 100,000 protein-coding genes, it turned out that the human genome encodes only about 20,000
- 25,000 genes [24, 25], about four times that of Pseudomonas aeruginosa (Gram-negative bacterium) [26]
and Saccharomyces cerevisiae (budding yeast) [27, 28] (both about 6000), not much more than the simple
Caenorhabditis elegan (nearly 20,000) [29], and only half as many as Oryza sativa (rice) [30, 31]. Intuitively
perceiving the number of genes as a measure of organismal complexity, we were more or less disappointed and
frustrated. Our euphoria of superiority continued to evaporate when the genome-wide nucleotide divergence
between chimp (Pan troglodyte) and human was revealed to be only 1.23% and may be even smaller [32].
Creating unprecedented civilization, we humans, are apparently not that special or superior, or are we? As
a book made up of only four letters and twenty words, genomes do not sound incomprehensible. It is simple
in what is printed out, but what is encoded implicitly is beyond our wildest dreams.
This dissertation focuses ultimately on the topic of evolution, which is the foundation of modern biol-
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ogy. We hope to understand, in a general sense, evolution on a population scale by investigating detailed
and specific individual level interactions. That is to say, evolution is an emergent property of interacting
populations. Always bearing in mind the big picture of evolution and ecology, we start our journey with
stochastic rate equations and master equations in statistical physics, and apply them to compute the pop-
ulation dynamics of microbe-virus systems. Analyzing fixed points and limit cycles in the phase diagram
describing the population dynamics, we reveal non-triviality in derivations from the microscopic level and
further provide physical interpretations and estimations testable in experiments.
Next I became interested in cooperative phenomena, which are ubiquitous in biology. In particular, I
focused on a recent experiment that quantifies the degree of cooperation in budding yeast as the environment
changes. It is hard to use the same approach of population dynamics as in the first project here because of the
high complexity in the metabolism and transportation mechanisms, which should require systems biology.
As an alternative, we retreat to mean field level and employ game theory. We successfully formulated a model
building up a direct link and showing consistent results between game theory and experimental measurable
quantities.
In order to dig deep into the origin and maintenance of cooperation, in the third project, we put forward a
novel mechanism encouraging cooperation in evolutionary game theory. Explicitly incorporating stochasticity
in the phenotypic decision making process, and the interaction between evolution and ecology in the dynamic
landscape, we demonstrate that for a wide variety of cooperative games of the prisoner’s dilemma type,
cooperation eventually becomes the dominant strategy as long as the rules are permitted to evolve in response
to the changing environment.
Understanding nature brings pleasure, but the power of theory is to predict. During the last 70 years or
so, the degree to which humans can influence the biosphere has become much more extensive, in particular
with the widespread use of antibiotics throughout the world. My last project turns out to be a reverse-
engineering problem: How to fight the emergence of antibiotic resistance? In other words, how to constrain
the population of pathogens so that no matter how they evolve, they are always bounded inside some
regions in the phase diagram safe to human? We design the next generation of antibiotics with presumably
no antibiotic resistance, and suggest practical treatment methods.
1.1 Micro-organismal Wonder World
The term “microorganism” specifies a form of life by its scale in a rather loose fashion. It refers to an
organism with a size typically around half to a few micrometers, but may range down to a hundredth of and
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up to several hundred micrometers. It can be acelluar, unicelluar, multicellluar or a cell cluster, covering
diverse species, including bacteria, archaea, eukarya, and even viruses. Microorganisms were discovered by
Anton van Leeuwenhoek (1632 - 1723) in 1675, and were later studied in the field of microbiology.
In this dissertation, we treat several micro-organismal systems using population dynamics and game
theory. We focus on some model species in eukaryotes, bacteria and their viruses, but the methods and
discussions are not limited to the specified examples, and applicable to other systems.
Microbes and their viruses are the most genetically diverse, abundant and widely distributed organisms
across the planet [33, 34, 35, 36]. Microbes are major contributors to the global biogeochemical cycles and
catalyze the reactions that have over evolutionary time brought the Earth’s surface to its present redox state
[37]. Similarly, viruses, especially in the oceans, manipulate marine communities through predation and
horizontal gene transfer [38, 39], recycle nutrients and thus drive the biological pump which leads inter alia
to the sequestration of carbon in the deep ocean [40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49].
Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) [50, 51] is a process in which an organism transfers genetic material to
another cell that is not its o↵spring. It is very common in the micro-organismal world, and happens intra-,
and inter-species, and even across domains such as between bacterial and animals [52, 53]. Recently, such
evidence for horizontal transfer of genes and even transposons was found in mammals, fish, and tetrapods
[54, 55, 56]. Through horizontal gene transfer, it is very convenient to shu✏e genes in the micro-organismal
world. In other words, micro-organisms are able to share, absorb and discard genes, especially under stressful
conditions [57]. Horizontal gene transfer, to a great extent, is sometimes thought to disrupt the traditional
perspective of species in the vertical gene transfer world, where genes are generally passed on from ancestors
to o↵springs [51] (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). The ribosomal tree of life tracks the evolutionary history of a lineage
through highly conserved genes, and so this is una↵ected by the presence of HGT. However, the idea of
a species as having a fixed and narrowly-delimited genome appears not to be correct, with accumulating
evidence in favor of the pan-genome concept in which there are wide variations in genome contents as
organisms access pools of genes through the virosphere or from other microbes with which they are in
contact through a shared ecological niche [58]. HGT significantly accelerates the spread of genes, which
propagates antibiotic resistance, as we would like to discuss in more details later.
Furthermore, the special role of viruses in the micro-organismal world complicates gene transfer processes.
The interaction between viruses and their hosts is far more intricate than the physical relation between
classical predators and preys. Viruses act more like self-replicable gene-reservoirs. As an example, we are
now ready to introduce here the specific microbe-virus system that we will discuss in more details in Chapter
3 of this dissertation. This system is composed of a set of viruses (  phage), which can infect a bacterium
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Figure 1.1: Vertical evolution and the “tree of life”. After Ref. [6].
Figure 1.2: Horizontal evolution and the “tree of life”. After Ref. [7].
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Figure 1.3: Two pathways in temperate phage infection: Lysis and lysogeny. In the lytic pathway, the
host cell is killed. A large number of phages will assemble using the host’s genetic material and molecular
machinery, and be released into the environment. Another pathway—lysogeny—incorporates viral genetic
material into the chromosome of the host. The prophage replicates with the host and its o↵springs, and can
be subsequently released, typically triggered by the stress response of the host to environmental changes.
After Ref. [8].
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(Escherichia coli). Upon temperate phage infection, there are two pathways awaiting the host bacterium [8]
as sketched in Figure 1.3. In the first pathway—lysis—the bacteriophage produces a large number of copies
of itself utilizing the bacterium’s genetic material and molecular machinery. As a result, the bacterium
ceases its metabolic function, and ruptures, releasing the newly assembled bacteriophage inside. The other
pathway is lysogeny. In this process, the intruder integrates its own DNA into the genome of the bacterium,
enters a dormant stage and becomes a prophage. The infected bacterium is known as a lysogen—a relatively
stable state [59], immune to superinfection from the same or related strains, and proceeding under normal
replication life-cycles. The DNA of the bacteriophage is duplicated, along with that of the host during cell
replication. The lysogenic state can be terminated by environmental stress such as starvation, pollution or
ultraviolet irradiation, resulting in the process known as prophage induction: the exit of the prophage from
the host genome, and subsequent lysis of the original bacterium and its bacterial descendants. We would
like to emphasize the miracle and duality of prophages here. For viral sake, prophages are sheltered inside
their hosts. They are temporarily dormant but potentially massive in future phage production. For host’s
sake, prophages may economize hosts’ metabolism [60]. Suppressing unnecessary metabolic activities by
expressing repressors and transcriptional regulators, they downshift hosts’ energy cost and help the survival
of both in harsh environments.
Horizontal gene transfer and genetic switch in phage infection are illustrated as glimpses into the micro-
organismal wonder world. The complicated interactions call for both universal and detailed analysis and
modeling.
1.2 Coexistence and Cooperation
There are millions of species on the planet. About 1.3 million eukaryotes are recorded, named and cataloged,
but more are reported each year. A recent taxonomic classification [61] under debate predicts 8.7 million
globally. Even in the human gut, a metagenomic sequencing in 2010 [62] revealed on average at least
160 bacterial species for each individual. How can so many species coexist in a limited range of resources
and spaces? The famous “paradox of the plankton” is a long-standing enigma [63, 64, 65] on the origin,
maintenance and prosperity of biodiversity.
Coexistence of di↵erent species in the same niche may expose them to fierce survival competition for
limited nutrition and space, and antagonism as predators and preys, but may also bring them to cooperation
[66].
Cooperation is the behavior of an individual dedicating its own resource or e↵ort to confer benefit on
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others or the whole community. Cooperative behavior is widely observed at all levels of biology. J.B.S.
Haldane’s famous saying that “I will jump into the river to save two brothers or eight cousins” [67, 68]
descriptively illustrates self-sacrifice in exchange for the benefit of others. Teamwork is another good example
of cooperation, pervasive not only in human society [69], but also in other mammals [70], such as wolves [71]
and bats [72, 73], and social insects, such as bees [74] and ants [75].
Down to the level of micro-organisms, horizontal gene transfer [76, 77, 78, 79] and quorum sensing [80, 81]
are two examples of mechanisms manifesting cooperation. Horizontal gene transfer, contrary to vertical gene
transfer from a parent to its o↵springs, is a gene-sharing mechanism, operative inter- and intra-species, and
even across di↵erent domains of life. Quorum sensing coordinates gene expression according to a local
population density. To this repertoire of cooperation we add lysogen, a coexistent state of an initially
antagonizing host and phage. They cooperate and exploit each other in energy expenditure [60] to survive
through unfavored environments.
Furthermore, multicellular organisms are themselves a question for cooperation: Why and how can the
majority of the cells of an individual take part in metabolism and daily functioning while a few are endowed
with the privilege of passing genes to the next organismal generation [82]? Even on the cellular level, genes
and proteins cooperate in gene expression [83] and other cellular processes [84].
In sum, coexistence of di↵erent species is observed in myriad habitats, and cooperation is a universal
phenomenon at all levels of biology.
1.3 Evolution and Coevolution
Carl Woese once said that his key word is “evolution”. It is the evolution of life over billions of years that
brings us the colorful, beautiful and wonderful planet we stand on today. The special evolvability in life
complicates biology, but also establishes and distinguishes it from physics and chemistry.
Evolution is generally recognized on a long timescale such as phylogeny and tree of life. Richard E. Lenski
tracks the evolution of Escherichia coli over half million generations [85], and observed ever-increasing fitness
[86]. It is also possible to notice evolution on a much shorter timescale as the evidence o↵ered by A.P. Hendry
et al. [87] for reproductive isolation in an introduced sockeye salmon after less than 13 generations.
Evolution is usually reckoned as the process of adaption for species to their environment via mutation
and natural selection. Such a process actually should be bidirectional or reticulated instead of unidirectional
because every individual or species serves as the evolutionary background for other individuals or species in
the process of its own evolution. In predator-prey ecosystems, both types of agents are stressing and being
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stressed by their counterparts, leading to a coevolutionary arms race [88]. Such a Red Queen e↵ect is widely
observed in nature. For example, the spirochete, a pathogen that causes Lyme disease, changes its surface
protein frequently by insertion of new patches of DNA into its genome so that it can evade the searchlight
of the immune system [89] of the host. The cost and payo↵, and evolvability vary for di↵erent organisms.
It is being increasingly realized that the classical view of microbial viruses purely as predators is too
limited. Many microbe-virus interactions are lysogenic. Viruses can transfer genes to and from bacteria,
as well as being predators of them, so that the virosphere should properly be recognized as a massive gene
reservoir [90, 91, 51, 49]. Thus there is a coevolution of both communities in a much deeper sense regarding
gene shu✏ing, the e↵ects of which are complex and far-reaching [92, 93, 94, 42, 91, 95, 51, 49], even including
the manipulation of bacterial mutation rates [96]. This nontrivial interaction between microbes and viruses
has not gone unnoticed, with wide interest among biologists, ecologists and geologists [97, 98, 99, 100, 34,
101, 102, 95, 60, 103, 104].
These findings highlight the importance of considering ecosystem dynamics within an evolutionary con-
text. Conversely, evolution needs to be properly understood as arising from a spatially-resolved ecological
context, as was first recognized by Wallace over 150 years ago [105]. That speciation, and adaptation in gen-
eral, arises at a particular point in time and space has a number of deep consequences that have not yet been
incorporated into current theory. First, it means that evolutionary dynamics proceeds by the propagation of
fronts, resulting in a complex and dynamical pattern of speciation, adaptation and genome divergence that
reflects its intrinsic dynamics and that of the heterogeneous and dynamical environment [106, 107, 108, 109].
Second, as fronts expand, there are only a few pioneer organisms at the leading edge, and so demographic
fluctuations are much larger than in the bulk. Such fluctuations profoundly influence the spatial structure
of the populations, and during the last few years have been recognized to play a major role in population
cycles [110] and even spatial pattern formation [111]. Third, the existence of horizontal gene transfer and
genome rearrangement processes is strongly coupled to spatial distribution. For example, it is known that
the probability of conjugation events is dependent on the local density, being essentially one per generation
in closely-packed biofilms, but an order of magnitude smaller in planktonic culture [112]. Moreover, the
mechanism of horizontal gene transfer is also dependent on the density, with viral-mediated transduction
being the most relevant mechanism at low density. How these patterns of evolutionary dynamics and species
distribution play out is essentially unexplored. However, there have recently been the first reports of obser-
vations of the coupling between evolutionary and ecological timescales. In one such system (a predator-prey
system realized in rotifer-algae interactions), it has been demonstrated that rapid evolutionary dynamics
is responsible for the unusual phase-lag characteristics of the observed population oscillations [113]. Thus,
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rapid evolution is not only a major force for adaptation, but can have marked ecological consequences too.
The complex interplay between evolution and the environment is nowhere more important than in early
life, where the key questions concern how life emerged from abiotic geochemistry. Early life experienced
demanding environments, whose closest modern day correspondence might be deep ocean hydrothermal
vents or hot springs. It is known that there are high occurrence of lysogens in both environments [36, 114],
suggesting that microbe-phage interactions might also be important in the early stages of life, with lysogens
playing an important role as a reservoir of genes and perhaps even aiding in the stabilization of early life
populations through the limit cycle mechanism discussed in this dissertation.
1.4 Arms Race: Human VS Pathogens
Bacteria are a major cause and spread of diseases. The fight of humans against pathogens dates back to
early human history. As a milestone, in 1928, Sir Alexander Fleming (1881 - 1955) discovered penicillin.
In the 1940th, clinical treatment was introduced. Saving millions of lives, the potential for antibiotics to
improve human health cannot be exaggerated.
However, the fast evolution and adaptation of bacteria has shattered our long-term ideal dream to stop
diseases with antibiotics once and for all [115, 116, 117]. Development of new antibiotics and the resulting
development of antibiotic resistance seem to trap us in a never-ending arms race (Figure 1.4). Since the
1960s, discovering new classes of antibiotics has nearly bogged down while increased antibiotic resistance has
been observed [4]. In United States alone, millions of kilograms of antibiotics are consumed by human and
at least an order of magnitude higher in animal industry and agriculture. Antibiotics are more incautiously
used in developing countries. The wide use and abuse of antibiotics worldwide expedite antibiotic resistance.
The situation aggravates with multidrug resistance (MDR), whose frequency also increases significantly with
time [118, 19, 9]. The threat of no e↵ective antibiotics is on the horizon, and is already a reality for a number
of infections, such as gonorrhea [119] and tuberculosis [120]. Actually many scientists have warned human
of the return of the dark ages [121, 4].
In order to slow down the pace of emergence and spread of antibiotic resistance, we propose and analyze
two general schemes. The first is to narrow down the spectrum of antibiotics focusing on pathogens and
bailing out healthy microbiota from conventional antibiotics. In this way, the source of resistant genes
shrinks for pathogens. We demonstrate delayed emergence of resistance in narrow and ultra-narrow spectrum
antibiotics. The second scheme, named Quorum Sensing Spoofing (QSS), is to take advantage of the quorum
sensing mechanism in expressing virulence. The highlight is no antibiotic resistance in QSS. We also design
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Figure 1.4: Timeline of antibiotic deployment and the evolution of antibiotic resistance. After Ref. [9].
dose cycles combining ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics with Quorum Sensing Spoofing, and show e ciency
in treatment with extremely low resistance against ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics in drug alternations.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are dedicated to the population dynamics of viruses and their hosts[122]. As
a preliminary exercise, we treat a lysis-only model first in Chapter 2. We apply the same technique to
lysogenic viruses and analyze fixed points and limit cycles of the full lysogeny-lysis model in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 presents our theory of cooperation in a micro-organismal snowdrift game[123]. It directly links
game theory with experimental measurable quantities.
Chapter 5 also focuses on game theory and cooperation, but from a totally di↵erent point of view. It
introduces a novel mechanism enhancing cooperation in evolutionary game theory.
Chapter 6 presents our first attempt to apply population dynamics to medicine. It is dedicated to the
design of next generation of antibiotics.




Population Dynamics of Lytic Viruses
and Their Hosts
2.1 Introduction
Numerically, viruses are the most abundant living entities on the planet with an estimated population of at
least 1030 in the ocean alone [34, 41]. By “viruses”, we refer to both bacterial and archaeal viruses. Bacterial
viruses are also commonly known as “phages” or “bacteriophages”.
The taxonomy of viruses is most probably still in its infant stage of “stamp collecting”. (Lord Ernest
Rutherford (1871 - 1937) once quipped that “All science is either physics or stamp collecting” [1].) The
present virus classification is a derivation of D.E. Bradley’s scheme [124] based on nucleic acid type, genome
structure and morphology. In 2005 the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) approved
3 orders and 73 families [125]. Figure 2.1 illustrates common virus morphotypes. The majority of viruses
have double-stranded DNA (dsDNA), some with single-stranded DNA (ssDNA), some with single-stranded
RNA (ssRNA), and very rare with double-stranded RNA (dsRNA). Among the various types, some are
virulent (lytic) viruses, which will lyse the host upon infection, and some are temperate (lysogenic) viruses,
which are endowed with binary pathways of lysis and lysogeny as illustrated in Figure 1.3. Table 2.1 lists
common lytic and lysogenic viruses infecting Escherichia coli.
Our goal in this chapter is to lay a theoretical foundation for describing the interplay between ecology
and evolution in the context of microbe-virus systems, as these are arguably amongst the most important
and probably the simplest of the complex systems in biology. The questions that will ultimately interest
us are the evolutionary pressures that tune genetic switches governing the lysis-lysogeny decision, as well
as the factors that shape prophage induction in response to environmental stress [126, 127, 128]. Such a
foundation must begin with a proper account of the population dynamics itself, before coupling in detail
to other levels of description involving genome dynamics, for example. Thus, we have chosen to focus in
the present chapter and Chapter 3 on the dynamics of microbe-virus systems, taking full account of both
of the major viral pathways. In these two chapters, we are not specific about whether we are dealing with
bacterial or archaeal viruses, but because most of the experiments to date are carried out on bacteria, we
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Figure 2.1: Typical virus morphotypes classified according to the nucleic acid type, genome structure and
morphology. After Ref. [10].
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Table 2.1: Common virulent and temperate viruses infecting Escherichia coli. T: Temperate phage; L:
Virulent phage. After Ref. [2].

















have tended to identify the microbes as bacteria and the viruses as phages, even though this is not required
by the mathematics.
2.2 Population Dynamics: Ensemble VS Individual Level
We now discuss briefly existing treatments of population dynamics in the context of microbe-virus systems.
In 1977, Levin et al. [129] extended the celebrated Lotka-Volterra equations to model the dynamics between
virulent phages and their victims, where only virulent phages are considered. A number of extensions have
been proposed, extending the level of biological realism to include such features as the time delay arising
between infection and lysis as well as the evolution of kinetic parameters [130, 131, 132, 133, 88]. In 2007,
Weitz and Dusho↵ [11] proposed another way to improve the classic predator-prey model. Their attempt
was mainly based on the experimental observation that the ability of a bacteriophage to lyse hosts degrades
when the bacteria approach their carrying capacity [134, 135, 136]. Adding a new term to account for
the saturation of the infection of the bacteriophages, they obtained an interesting phase diagram in which
the fate of the bacteria-phage community can depend on the initial conditions. However, the new term is
put in by hand, based on intuition which needs detailed mathematical support. Furthermore, they focused
on virulent phages and excluded the temperate ones that elicit lysogeny, now regarded as essential to the
survival of microbial communities through fluctuating environments [99, 60, 103].
These works are based upon an ensemble-level description of the community, as in the classic work on
predator-prey systems [137]. However, as is well-known [137], the simplest of these models fails to capture
the intrinsic cyclical behavior of predator-prey populations despite apparently incorporating fully the basic
interactions that should give rise to cycles. This paradox was resolved by the important work of McKane
and Newman [110], who showed that cyclical e↵ects could only be captured at the level of an individual-level
model, and arose through the amplification of demographic noise. Their work showed how the conventional
ensemble-level equations for predator-prey systems arose as the mean field limit of the appropriate statistical
field theory, with the essential e↵ects of demographic noise entering the analysis as one-loop corrections to
mean field theory, in an inverse population size expansion. These e↵ects can also be treated in a slightly more
convenient formalism using path integrals [138]. The literature also does not have an explicit representation
of lysogeny as it modifies the population dynamics of both host and phage.
The use of an individual-level model is important for a separate reason. By starting from microscopic rate
processes, we can capture specific biological interactions and derive the corresponding mean-field population
dynamics systematically. Such models are not always straightforward to write down phenomenologically, as
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shown by the fact that the equations assumed by Weitz and Dusho↵ [11] are not, as we show below, the
most general form that takes into account the e↵ects of host fitness on lysis.
The purpose of this chapter and Chapter 3 is to provide a detailed theory of the population dynamics for
host-phage communities. In contrast to earlier work, we pose the problem at the microscopic level, working
with an individual-level model of bacteria and phage. From this fundamental description, we are able to
derive the usual community level description analogous to Lotka-Volterra equations from a mean field theory.
Our results encompass both virulent phages, such as those in Weitz and Dusho↵’s work [11], and lysogenic
phages which have not been studied mathematically up to now.
In this chapter, as a preliminary exercise, to present the technique, we treat a lysis-only model applicable
to lytic viruses, in which we derive a set of dynamical equations roughly in the same form as in Weitz and
Dusho↵’s paper [11] except for an additional parameter, which generally results in a relatively unimportant
shift in the phase diagram. We will extend the technique to treat the full lysogeny-lysis model applicable to
lysogenic viruses in Chapter 3.
2.3 Derivation of Population Dynamics from an Individual-level
Model
In this section, we adapt the classic predator-prey model to the host-phage communities from a microscopic
or individual-level model. For simplicity, we first focus on two-component competition, where lysogens
are excluded in spite of their biological importance. Hence, we are considering virulent phages and their
hosts. Following the procedure given by McKane and Newman [110], we derive the population dynamics
for the host-phage system, which Weitz and Dusho↵ [11] had written down phenomenologically. Here we
work at the level of mean field theory, and we do not, in this chapter, include the extension necessary for
representing spatial degrees of freedom. Our individual-level model formalism is still needed, however, to
systematically derive the population dynamics from the microscopic interactions. In our model, the host-
phage dynamics di↵erentiates itself from the classic predator-prey model in two ways: (1) only the host
population is restricted by carrying capacity due to resource limitation and (2) the lysis of one host releases
a particular number of phages (for example, about 100 replicates for lambda phage [8]), instead of only one
predator in the classic predator-prey model. The above two points need to be accounted for carefully in the
set up of the model, especially in the introduction and application of the carrying capacity, which will be
explained explicitly as follows.
In our host-phage community, we have only one species of host and one species of phage which preys upon
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the former. Let us label the hosts by A and phages by B, whose populations are m and n, respectively. The
hosts, either heterotrophic or autotrophic, need to consume environmental resources, which are renewable
in every cycle, for survival and reproduction. All the environmental limitations on the hosts are abstracted
into a maximal host population, which is denoted by the carrying capacity K. The phages, on the other
hand, do not rely on the consumption of natural resources for maintenance once they are released into the
environment. Thus, there is no such hard constraint on the phage population. Although phages are not
restricted by K, we still introduce a virtual carrying capacity W for phages from dimensional considerations.
It can be imagined that W ! 1 so that no true carrying capacity is imposed on the phage population.
The carrying capacities can be better visualized if we conceive space to be equally divided into K units for
hosts and W units for phages. These units will be referred to as the host layer and phage layer, respectively.
In the host layer, each unit is either occupied by one host or unoccupied, i.e. an empty site E. The total
number of empty sites E is K m. We construct the phage layer in a similar manner and denote the empty
sites there by   although the phage population is not confined actually.
The population dynamics of the system can thus be modeled as arising from the following six microscopic
events (Table 2.2):
Table 2.2: Microscopic events in the lysis-only model.
description symbols
birth of host AE
b! AA
death of host due to longevity A
c! E
death of host due to crowding e↵ect AA
d! AE
host-phage interaction
· under good metabolism AEB e! EE↵B
· under poor metabolism AAB f! EA B
death of phage B
g!  
Here, b, c, d, e, f and g are all constant rates. All the events above are written with constraints, with
a nonlinear relation being incorporated automatically by adding empty sites E to the left of the arrows to
reflect the restriction of carrying capacity K. For example, the birth of the host is density dependent, which
needs an empty site to accommodate the newly-born host. If no empty site is found, such an event can
not happen. Since we consider only the mean field case, no spatial inhomogeneity is introduced. There is
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no concept of locality here, either. As long as an empty site is found, the newly-born host is permitted.
The crowding e↵ect describes the competition in survival for limited natural resources among hosts. No
such crowding e↵ect exists for phages, which is in line with our assumption that there is no true carrying
capacity confining the phage population. The two events in host-phage interaction are carefully chosen to
give a minimal model while encompassing reduced lysis when the host population is approaching its carrying
capacity. On the left hand side of the arrows, we use “AE” and “AA” to label the good and poor metabolic
status of the host, respectively. In this way, the e↵ect of phage infection is entangled with the metabolism of
its host. On the right hand side of the arrows, ↵ and   are the numbers of progeny for phage reproduction
under good and poor metabolism, respectively. There are two primary reasons which may account for the
reduced lysis e↵ect. The first is the decrease in the phage reproduction number [134], i.e.
↵ >  , (2.1)
because phages need bacterial genetic materials, molecular machinery and energy in the synthesis of their
replicates. When the normal function of the host is down-regulated, phage replication is correspondingly
down-shifted. The second reason is reduced e ciency during phage infection, either in adsorption rates or
viable infection, which leads to a diminishing of the infection cycle [134], i.e.
e > f. (2.2)
It might seem as if the model is discrete in the representation of metabolism, since we put in good and
poor metabolism by hand. However, note that the actual metabolism of the community may be somewhere
between good and poor, i.e. a linear combination, depending on the probability or fraction to enter either
event. Hence, the separation of good and poor metabolism is an essential part of our model, which yields
the reduced lysis e↵ect within the context of a minimal model. Finally, although phages do not age, their
death can be induced by the rupture of capsids, and the corresponding rate is constant with time [2].
The time evolution of the whole community is accessed by random sampling. In each time step, we have
a probability µ to draw units in the host layer and a probability ⌫ to draw units in the phage layer. In
the host layer, we may draw either one unit with probability ! or two units with probability 1   !. In
the phage layer, only one unit is drawn. If a combination not listed in Table 2.2 is drawn, such as EEB,
nothing happens. Thus all we need to consider are the above events. Using simple combinatorics, it is
straightforward to obtain the probability for the combinations as in Table 2.3), where the factor 2 accounts
the equality in probability for events AE and EA, or AEB and EAB.
17
Table 2.3: Probabilities for the combinations in the lysis-only model.
combination probability
A µ (1  ⌫)!m
K
AA µ (1  ⌫) (1  !) m (m  1)
K (K   1)
AE µ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2m (K  m)
K (K   1)
AEB µ⌫ (1  !) 2m (K  m)
K (K   1)
n
W
AAB µ⌫ (1  !) m (m  1)
K (K   1)
n
W
B (1  µ) ⌫ n
W
Thus we obtain the transition matrices for each kind of variation in the population during each time
step, such as hT (m+ 1, n|m,n)i, and further the evolution for the probability in the population with m
hosts and n phages at time t P (m,n, t). The reader is referred to Appendix A for calculational details.








nP (m,n, t) . (2.3b)
Thus, the time evolution for the population size is
d hmi
dt
= hT (m+ 1, n|m,n)i   hT (m  1, n|m,n)i
  hT (m  1, n+ ↵  1|m,n)i
  hT (m  1, n+     1|m,n)i , (2.4a)
d hni
dt
= (↵  1) hT (m  1, n+ ↵  1|m,n)i
+ (    1) hT (m  1, n+     1|m,n)i
  hT (m,n  1|m,n)i . (2.4b)
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Here we have taken the mean field theory limit and neglected all the correlations and fluctuations.


































  = ↵  1, (2.6c)
dm =















Considering Eq. (2.1), we notice that Eq. (2.6f) (2.6g) yield the following relation
0 < am < an < 1. (2.7)
Generally speaking, am 6= an unless
↵ =  , (2.8)
which implies that the reproduction numbers under good and poor metabolism are the same as in Weitz and
Dusho↵’s model. This concludes the derivation of the equations for population dynamics from the individual
or microscopic level.
2.4 Results































We can non-dimensionalize the evolution equations (2.5). Omitting the primes we obtain
dm
dt
= m (1 m)   mn (1 m)  dmm, (2.10a)
dn
dt








we obtain three fixed points. The first is a trivial fixed point
m = 0, (2.12a)
n = 0, (2.12b)
which is stable when
dm > 1. (2.13)
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The second corresponds to the phage extinction phase
m = 1  dm, (2.14a)
n = 0, (2.14b)
which is stable when












(1  dm) [1  an (1  dm)]
. (2.17)
The last is the coexistence of hosts and phages










where ⇢ is a root of
an ⇢
2    ⇢+ dn = 0. (2.19)




dm < 1  ⇢. (2.21)
The stability of the fixed points are governed by the Jacobian
0
B@
(1  2m) (1   n)  dm   m (1 m)





m (1 m)   mn (1 m)  dmm = 0, (2.23a)
 mn (1  anm)  dnn = 0. (2.23b)
Thus we obtain the three-dimensional phase diagram plotted in Figure 2.2. The basin of attraction for
the trivial case is not plotted. Region II is the basin of attraction for coexistence fixed point only while region



















Figure 2.2: Three dimensional phase diagram for the lysis-only model. Region I depends on the initial
conditions to flow to the phage extinction or coexistence fixed point. Region II and III are basins of
attraction for coexistence and phage extinction fixed points, respectively.
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2.5 Discussions and Conclusion
Figure 2.3: Phase diagram in Weitz and Dusho↵’s model. d, m and   are dimensionless death rates for the
host and phage, and their coupling coe cient, corresponding to dm, dn and   in our model, respectively.
Region I, II, and III have the same meanings as in Figure 2.2. After Ref. [11].
As we can see, the bottom plane in Figure 2.2 corresponds to the phase diagram in Weitz and Dusho↵’s
model as shown in Figure 2.3, where an = 1. When
↵ >   (2.24)
leading to
an > 1, (2.25)
there is a shift in the phase diagram with a rapid shrinkage of the basin of attraction for region II, where




, which implies that the more the good and poor metabolisms di↵er from each other in the progeny
number, the easier the phages are driven out of the system. In order to see the e↵ect of the phase shift more
clearly, let us tune an = 1.3 while keeping all the other parameters as those in Figure 2 (I) in Weitz and
Dusho↵’s paper [11] (Figure 2.4). When an = 1, there is a neutral fixed point for coexistence. However,
such a fixed point disappears (Figure 2.5) when an = 1.3. The flow diagrams are generated by 4th order
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Runge-Kutta method.












Figure 2.4: Flow diagram for an = 1,  = 5, dn = 1, dm = 0.1. “⇥” denotes saddle points and “·” is for stable
fixed points.
In summary, we have obtained Weitz and Dusho↵’s model by detailed derivation from the individual or
microscopic level and found a small shift in the phase diagram. Such a shift, as we see, can be observed
experimentally by the onset of coexistence for the two species.
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Population Dynamics of Lysogenic
Viruses and Their Hosts
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we present the technique to systematically derive mean-field population dynamics for lytic
viruses and their hosts using an individual-level model of microscopic rate processes. In this chapter, we
continue to develop the formalism for the community of hosts and phages in the full lysogeny-lysis model.
Interestingly, we find that for certain combination of parameters, the community exhibits a limit cycle for all
the species in the phase space, even at the level of mean field theory. In order to interpret the corresponding
range of parameters in a useful way for experimental observations, we map the parameters to rates in
chemical reactions. In order to explore the robustness of our results, we demonstrate in Section 3.6 that
the corresponding limit cycle arises also in stochastic simulations with the Gillespie algorithm. Finally, in
Section 3.7 we estimate the feasibility of verifying our predictions in laboratory experiments.
3.2 Derivation of Population Dynamics from an Individual-level
Model
In this section, we extend the lysis-only model in Chapter 2 to incorporate lysogeny and investigate the
important role of lysogeny in host-phage dynamics. Now there are three types of organism in the community.
There are “healthy” hosts, which have no integration of phage genes, lysogens, and free phages, which live
outside bacteria membranes. We will label “healthy” hosts, lysogens and free phages by A, D, and B,
respectively, with population sizes m, s and n. For the same reasons as in the lysis-only model, hosts and
phages are thought of as being confined in di↵erent layers characterized by di↵erent carrying capacities.
Hence both “healthy” hosts and lysogens are in the host layer with a total carrying capacity K. The empty
sites in the host layer are denoted by E and their number is K  m  s. In the phage layer, the empty sites
are labelled by   as before.
The incorporation of lysogens brings us more microscopic events. There are two pathways after phage
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infections: lysis and lysogeny. Immediate lysis for temperate phages is the same process as for virulent ones,
which has been characterized by events in the previous section. Lysogeny is an option only for temperate
phages, which will be investigated in detail here. First, there should be an event corresponding to lysogen
formation, i.e. a phage integrates its DNA into the genome of the host and turns itself into a prophage.
Second, lysogens will survive, replicate and die as “healthy” hosts. Last, environments might trigger prophage
induction, which lyses the lysogen and releases the prophages inside. In all, there are eighteen microscopic
events, which are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Microscopic events in the lysogeny-lysis model.
description symbols



















· lysis under good metabolism AEB e! EE↵B
· lysis under poor metabolism AAB f! EA B
ADB
f! ED B
· lysogeny under good metabolism AEB h! DE




· under good metabolism DE p! EE↵B
· under poor metabolism DD q! DE B
DA
q! AE B
death of free phage B
g!  
Here b, c, d, e, f , g, h, k, p and q are constant reaction rates. ↵ and   are phage reproduction numbers
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under good and poor metabolisms, respectively. Although prophage induction enhances the survival ability
for lysogens in several ways, such as suppressing the latter’s metabolism [60] through down-regulation [139],
for simplicity we have assumed the same birth and death rates for “healthy” hosts and lysogens. We have
the condition
↵ >  , (3.1)
as before. Furthermore, there are the following advantages under better metabolism: more successful and
e↵ective infection (Eq. (3.2a)), greater possibility to lyse the host (Eq. (3.2b)), and faster prophage release
(Eq. (3.2c)). Since the mechanism for the lysis-lysogeny decision making of initial infection is di↵erent from
the genetic switch for prophage induction [8, 140] , we do not expect any special relationship between e and
f , and p and q. These advantages can be expressed mathematically by the following inequalities:







p > q. (3.2c)
We draw events from the two layers the same way as in the lysis-only model and this results in the proba-
bilities shown in Table 3.2.
From these events, we obtain the following evolution equations for all the three species after the calcu-
























































Table 3.2: Probabilities for the combinations in the lysogeny-lysis model.
combination probability
AE µ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2m (K  m  s)
K (K   1)
DE µ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2s (K  m  s)
K (K   1)
A µ (1  ⌫)!m
K
D µ (1  ⌫)! s
K
AA µ (1  ⌫) (1  !) m (m  1)
K (K   1)
DD µ (1  ⌫) (1  !) s (s  1)
K (K   1)
AD µ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2ms
K (K   1)
AEB µ⌫ (1  !) 2m (K  m  s)
K (K   1)
n
W
AAB µ⌫ (1  !) m (m  1)
K (K   1)
n
W
ADB µ⌫ (1  !) 2ms
K (K   1)
n
W











































 2 <  1, (3.5)
0 < a1, a21, a22, a31, a32 < 1, (3.6)
a32 < a22. (3.7)
We also notice some kind of symmetry in the correction terms such as “1   a1” and “1   2a1”. a1
originates from the poor metabolism of hosts A, which indirectly downshifts the e ciency of phage infection
and synthesis. In equation (3.3a), “a1” comes from the event AAB
f! EA B, while “2a1” is from ADB
f!
ED B. The factor “2” appears since “AD” is the same as “DA”.
Considering
↵   1, (3.8)
for example,
↵ ⇡ 100 (3.9)
for lambda phage [8], we approximate
(↵  1) 1   ↵ 2 ⇡ ↵ ( 1    2) . (3.10)
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Hence equation (3.3c) can be simplified as
dn
dt














In this section, we explore the predictions of the lysogeny-lysis model given by equations (3.3a), (3.3b) and
(3.11).
Let

































and omitting the primes, the equations after non-dimensionalization become
dm
dt
= m (1 m  s)  d1m   1mn [1  (1  a1)m  (1  2a1) s] , (3.13a)
ds
dt
= s (1 m  s)  d1s+  2mn [1  (1  a21)m  (1  2a21) s]
  d2s [1  (1  2a22)m  (1  a22) s] , (3.13b)
dn
dt
= ( 1    2)mn [1  (1  a31)m  (1  2a31) s]
+ d2s [1  (1  2a32)m  (1  a32) s]  d3n. (3.13c)
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However, we can only obtain four fixed points analytically. The first is the trivial case for the extinction of
all the species
m = 0, (3.15a)
s = 0, (3.15b)
n = 0. (3.15c)
The second is the “healthy” host extinction fixed point
m = 0, (3.16a)
s =
1  d1   d2





s [1  (1  a32) s] . (3.16c)
The third is the “healthy” host only fixed point
m = 1  d1, (3.17a)
s = 0, (3.17b)
n = 0. (3.17c)





s = 0, (3.18b)
n =
1 m  d1
 1 [1  (1  a1)m]
, (3.18c)
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whose existence requires that















Figure 3.1: In the lysogeny-lysis model, a stable fixed point for the coexistence of all the three species. The
parameters are  1 = 1, 2 = 0.8, d1 = 0.5, d2 = 0.49, d3 = 0.1, a1 = a21 = a31 = 0.1, a22 = a32 = 0.5.
The more interesting coexistence of all the three species is hard to solve analytically since the order of
the equations
m (1 m  s)  d1m   1mn [1  (1  a1)m  (1  2a1) s] = 0, (3.20a)
s (1 m  s)  d1s+  2mn [1  (1  a21)m  (1  2a21) s]
  d2s [1  (1  2a22)m  (1  a22) s] = 0, (3.20b)
( 1    2)mn [1  (1  a31)m  (1  2a31) s]
+ d2s [1  (1  2a32)m  (1  a32) s]  d3n = 0, (3.20c)
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is too high. Using a 4th order Runge-Kutta method, we found numerically a stable fixed point, shown in
Figure 3.1.
3.4 Discussion
As shown in Eq. (3.13), there are, in total, ten parameters so that the phase space is di cult to visualize.
We have studied the general trend of the transition between phases, starting with the dependence on phage
mortality rate d3. In Figure 3.2, it is shown that when the phage mortality rate is low, the systems flows
into a “healthy” host extinction phase. The phage population decreases with increase in the phage mortality
rate, which is very reasonable physically. For intermediate values of d3, there is coexistence for all the three
species, while for large values of d3, the only survival is “healthy” host, where all phages die out quickly out,
leading to the extinction of lysogens.
























Figure 3.2: The population of the community with increasing phage mortality rate d3. “ms” indicates the
sum of m and s.
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Figure 3.3: The population for the community with the increase in the lysis rate d2.
We show the trend of the population with increasing lysis rate d2 in Figure 3.3. The phage prospers
with the increase in the lysis rate, while the lysogen diminishes. The peak in the phage population appears
when there is a balance in the number of lysogens available to lyse and the lysis rate. When the lysis rate
is beyond the threshold at 0.54, lysogen number falls dramatically and there is a proliferation of “healthy”
hosts. The total host population is roughly the same afterwards while the phage population upshifts a little
with the increase in the “healthy” host available to infect but does not change further when the ratio between
“healthy” hosts and lysogens converges.
We have studied the e↵ect of host mortality rate in Figure 3.4. Obviously the total host population
will fall monotonically when the hosts are more likely to die. We draw attention to the interesting peak
in the phage population. When the host mortality rate is low, the phage population is suppressed due to
the overcrowding of the lysogens, which degrades the metabolism and hence the infection and synthesis of
phages. When the host mortality rate is high, on the other hand, the phages have insu cient hosts to infect
and their population also declines.
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Figure 3.4: The population for the community with the increase in the host mortality rate d1.
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Figure 3.5: A limit cycle in the flow diagram for di↵erent initial conditions with parameters  1 = 1, 2 =
0.8, d1 = 0.5, d2 = 0.49, d3 = 0.03, a1 = a21 = a31 = 0.1, a22 = a32 = 0.5.
We have noticed that the dynamics exhibits a limit cycle [141, 142] for some combination of parameters
(Figure 3.5). In this section, we describe our numerical evidence for this assertion and present a plausible
physical interpretation of our finding. In order to verify that it is a limit cycle instead of some unexpected
slowing down near a putative stable or neutral fixed point, we have chosen an initial condition located
inside the conjectured limit cycle. If there is, in fact, no real limit cycle, the dynamics will flow inwards no
matter how slow it will be. However, as we can see in Figure 3.6, the trajectory indicated by the red curve
flows out. Hence we have observed in the flow diagram an oscillation in the population for all the three
species. If we inspect neighboring time steps, it appears that the convergence is slow, since the deviation













Figure 3.6: A limit cycle in the flow diagram with di↵erent initial conditions for parameters  1 = 1, 2 =
0.8, d1 = 0.5, d2 = 0.49, d3 = 0.03, a1 = a21 = a31 = 0.1, a22 = a32 = 0.5. The limit cycle is in a curved












Figure 3.7: A limit cycle in the flow diagram with di↵erent initial conditions for parameters  1 = 1, 2 =
0.8, d1 = 0.5, d2 = 0.49, d3 = 0.03, a1 = a21 = a31 = 0.1, a22 = a32 = 0.5. The limit cycle is in a curved
space.
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Figure 3.8: Cartoon explanation for the limit cycle. When the population for host and phages are both small,
the host will enjoy a boom because of good metabolism and little phage infection. Meanwhile prophages
replicate with the fast reproduction of lysogens. Once the lysogeny-lysis switch is triggered, the destruction
of lysogens will yield a huge virus burst. Then “healthy” host will encounter intensive phage infection and
hence be suppressed. When most of the host die out, phage population shrinks quickly due to lack of
infection. In this way, a cycle forms.
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illusion. Moreover, tilting the view angle, we see that the limit cycle is in some curved space instead of
a single plane in Figure 3.7. In order to investigate the emergence of the limit cycle, we have scanned
part of the parameter space. For example, there is a stable coexistence fixed point for d1 > 0.41 while
 1 = 1, 2 = 0.8, d2 = 0.9, d3 = 0.048, a1 = a21 = a31 = 0.1, and a22 = a32 = 0.5. However, the above
fixed point becomes unstable if d1 < 0.41 leading to the limit cycle. As we see it, such an oscillation of the
population in the community is a manifestation of the role of lysogens (Figure 3.8). When the population
for host and phages are both small, the host will enjoy a boom because of good metabolism and little
phage infection. Meanwhile prophages replicate with the fast reproduction of lysogens. Once the lysogeny-
lysis switch is triggered, the destruction of lysogens will yield a huge virus burst. Then “healthy” host
will encounter intensive phage infection and hence be suppressed. When most of the host die out, phage
population shrinks quickly due to lack of infection. In this way, a cycle forms. Integrating its DNA into
the genome of a lysogen, a prophage is sheltered although it is temporarily dormant in the sense of viral
infection. Such a stage assists prophages to survive demanding environmental conditions and provides an
opportunity to resurrect the population when there are abundant “healthy” hosts. Thus lysogens are perfect
genetic reservoirs for phages for potential future burst [51, 60].
3.6 Stochastic simulation
Up to now, all the calculations above were carried out within the scope of mean field theory. As a next
step, it is important to see to what extent such predictions are disturbed by demographic fluctuations, and
especially whether the limit cycle in the lysogeny-lysis model is stable. A second goal of this section is to
link the parameters the parameters in our model to those which could characterize real experiments. In
this section, we perform stochastic simulations using the Gillespie’s algorithm [143, 144], which is a very
e cient strategy to simulate chemical reactions. The reaction rates (b, c, d,e, f and g in Table 2.2, and
b, c, d, e, f , g, h, k, p and q in Table 3.1) are interpreted as average probability rates for the occurrence
of the corresponding reactions in line with the Gillespie algorithm, where the e↵ect of draw probability is
incorporated automatically.
In the lysis-only model, the map between the two sets of parameters for reactions is
eb = bK, (3.21a)









eg = g, (3.21f)
where tilde is used to indicate the probability rates in the Gillespie algorithm. Since there are more degrees
of freedom in choosing microscopic event rates, di↵erent stochastic simulations may map into the same mean
field phase diagram.



















Figure 3.9: A limit cycle in the phase space with parameters in the Gillespie algorithm eb = 0.4,ec = 0.1, ed =
0.2, e= 1.2⇥ 10 10, ef = 1.2⇥ 10 11, eg = 0.018,eh = 4.8⇥ 10 10,ek = 4.8⇥ 10 11, ep = 0.54, and eq = 0.27.
Our main interest is to explore the mean field limit cycle in the lysogeny-lysis model. We keep employing
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Figure 3.11: A limit cycle projected onto m-s plane in the mean field theory with parameters  1 = 1, 2 =
0.8, d1 = 0.5, d2 = 0.9, d3 = 0.03, a1 = a21 = a31 = 0.1, and a22 = a32 = 0.5.
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the tilde symbol to label the probability rates in the Gillespie sense and the map is
eb = bK, (3.22a)
















eg = g. (3.22j)
In Figure 3.9, we show a limit cycle observed in our stochastic simulations. It is broadly consistent
with the mean field predictions, as can be noted easily by the obvious similarities between Figure 3.10 and
Figure 3.11, and Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 (when we project the three-dimensional phase space onto two
dimensions), whose relationship is Eq. (3.12g), (3.12h) and (3.12i). As expected, we notice fluctuations in
the stochastic simulation. For example, if Figure 3.9 were shown in better resolution, we can see that the
curve fluctuates slightly around the limit cycle. Usually the fluctuation is two orders of magnitude smaller
than the mean value. In order to explore the robustness of the limit cycle, we ran extensive tests to try and
estimate their lifetime. For di↵erent parameter values that yield limit cycles in the mean field theory, we
map them each to six sets of typical parameters in the Gillespie algorithm, varying eb,ec, ed, e, ef, eg,eh,ek, ep and
eq while obeying constraints. We run simulations for 1010 time steps each with five sets of di↵erent initial
conditions. As long as the carrying capacity is large enough, we do not observe any disappearance of the
limit cycle. Furthermore, they all run into the same limit cycle.
Hence we conclude that the limit cycle is inherent to the model and robust to stochastic fluctuations,
which serves to confirm the essential role of lysogens in stabilizing the cycling in the populations.
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Figure 3.13: A limit cycle projected onto the s-n plane in the mean field theory with parameters  1 = 1, 2 =
0.8, d1 = 0.5, d2 = 0.9, d3 = 0.03, a1 = a21 = a31 = 0.1, and a22 = a32 = 0.5.
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3.7 Parameters in the model
Up to this point, all the parameters above or their values we have explored are di cult to relate to experiment.
The purpose of this section is to bridge the gap.
The birth rate of the host b is medium-dependent. Usually the expression of Lac proteins is highly
suppressed by Lac repressors in a lacose-free medium to optimize energy investment and metabolism of the
bacteria. In the above two models, we have categorized the death of the hosts to longevity and crowding.
In fact, it is hard to mark a watershed clearly. Instead, what is observed is a population-dependent growth
rate, which is a combined e↵ect of b, c and d. Herein, the rate d for the death of the host due to crowding is
introduced artificially to account for the actual population dependence. Thus, we are justified in assuming
that the death rate of the host due to longevity c, which incorporates other physical and non-density-
dependent factors, is fixed with the variation in host population. The growth rate for E. coli may drop to
0.2 h 1 at 37 C when glycolate serves as the carbon source but usually is in the range from 0.5 h 1 to 2.0
h 1 [145, 97]. The growth rate is species- and strain-specific, which for Pseudoalteromonas sp. strain SKA18
(accessible number AF188330 in GenBank) [134], for example, is an order of magnitude smaller. Similarly,
lysis rate f , lysogeny rate k, prophage induction rate q, and replicate number per capita  , which are all
under poor metabolism, are introduced manually to characterize the population-dependent feature of the
interactions in order to leave their population-independent counterparts e, h, p and ↵ fixed. In the case of
virulent phages, such as one in the family Siphoviridae [146] attacking Pseudoalteromonas sp. strain SKA18
[134], corresponding to the lysis-only model, the reported lysis rate spans from 0.2 to 2.0 h 1 subject to the
growth rate of the bacteria so that we can estimate e to be on the order of 1.0 h 1 and f to be an order of
magnitude smaller than e.
For temperate phages in the lysogeny-lysis model, the spontaneous lysis rate is far smaller, being of the
order of 10 9 to 10 7 per generation per cell [147]. The percentage of lysogens is assayed through prophage
induction by the addition of mitomycin C, UV radiation or other environmental conditions that may inhibit
lambda phage repressors. Under good metabolism the lysogeny rate h for   phage infecting E. coli and
prophage induction rate are on the order of 1 h 1 and 2 h 1, respectively [148]. Their counterparts under
poor metabolism are estimated to be one or two orders of magnitude smaller. For instance, the prophage
induction rate for log-phase marine lysogens [149] is on the order of 0.03 h 1. Replicate number per capita
↵ is about 100 for phage   [8], and may be up to 600 for phage W-14 [150], while   is about 20 or 30 for
both. Although virions do not age [2], their mortality is caused by the destabilization of the capsid, which
is dependent on physical conditions such as temperature, humidity and pH values. C. D. Jepson and J. B.
March [151] reported that phage   is highly stable, whose half life in suspension ranges from 2.3 days at
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4.2 C to 36 days at 20 C. Even if we take the half life be one day, the corresponding death rate g is on
the order of 10 6 per second and can be suppressed by cooling down. Actually, the loss of free phage in
nature, to a great extent, is through di↵usion since bacteria are more immobile due to their large particle size
compared to that of phages. In laboratory, the death rate can be manipulated through continuous dilution
and washing out, and a wide range of death rates can be realized.
When all the parameters are tuned properly, the limit cycle in the lysogeny-lysis model is observable in
experiment. We estimate the period of the limit cycle to be on the order of days. Take Figure 3.10 as an
example. A cycle there is composed of about 10, 000 computational steps, in other words 10, 000 events,
which corresponds to about 120 [time unit] in the simulation. In Figure 3.10 the birth rate is 0.6 [time
unit] 1, while in the real world the life cycle of an E. coli in good laboratory conditions, for example, is
about half an hour, which is 2 hour  1. Hence the cycle is 120 ⇥ 0.6/2 = 36 hours, which is one day and
a half. When we vary parameters in the Gillespie algorithm, as long as they map to the same limit cycle
in the mean field theory, the period stays the same. The period will change only when it corresponds to
di↵erent limit cycles in the mean field sense. When we increase d01 in the mean field theory, the period may
drop to 28 hours at the edge of the disappearance of the limit cycle.
3.8 Conclusion
We have derived the mean field population dynamics for host-phage communities both without (in Chapter
2) and with lysogens (this chapter). In the lysis-only model, we successfully obtained a description similar
to the starting point assumed by Weitz and Dusho↵ [11], and we found that the phase diagram was modified
only slightly to the di↵erence in good and poor metabolism. In the lysogeny-lysis model, we identified the
asymptotic states, which included not only coexistence and extinction fixed points, but population cycling of
all microbes, lysogens and phages. Our findings support the notion that lysogens act as a reservoir and are
in principle amenable to experimental verification. We simulated the stochastic process using the Gillespie
algorithm and verified the robustness of our results to fluctuations, and especially demonstrated the stability
of the limit cycle.
Although complicated, our model inevitably makes some drastic assumptions, among which the most
severe is the omission of spatial structure. Discreteness in the occurrence of speciation and adaptation in time
and space may have a complex interplay with spatial heterogeneity since it propagates with large fluctuations
at fronts [106, 107, 108, 109]. Such demographic noise may also induce robust spatial patterns beyond mean
field predictions [111]. Hence inclusion of spatial structure may yield interesting predictions about the spatial
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structure of microbe-virus communities, with concommitant consequences for the evolutionary dynamics too.
Another simplification is that we treat “healthy” hosts and lysogens in the same way regarding their natural
birth, death and crowding e↵ect. However, experimentally, the expression of prophage genes and the control
of host gene expression by viral genes seem to impart to lysogens econominization in their metabolism [60].
When unnecessary metabolic activities are suppressed, lysogens optimize their energy expenses and therefore
gain some survival advantage compared to “healthy” hosts in unfavorable conditions, which suggests that
the natural birth, death and crowding e↵ects of lysogens are distinct from those of “healthy” hosts. Hence
our model is a reasonable minimal model that can capture the non-trivial role of lysogens in the population
dynamics of microbe-phage communities, in addition to the usual predator-prey interactions, but more
biological realism could be introduced.
This work can be extended in several ways, but perhaps the most interesting are those which relate to
the evolution of the field of genes distributed amongst the microbes, viruses and lysogens. Lysogens are
genome carriers of not only microbes but also prophages, capable of yielding virus bursts when triggered by
environmental stress. In this way, the role of lysogens and viruses as a reservoir of genes is mediated through
phage infection and the lysogeny-lysis switch by the metabolism of the host. The metabolism of the host
is, in turn, to a great extent influenced by environmental conditions. Thus, this model is a starting point
for ecology-mediated evolution. It is also useful to stress that each individual microbe or virus constitutes
a part of another organism’s environment. Thus, the e↵ects which our work begins to treat, represent a
microcosm of the intricate interplay between ecology and evolution in microbe-virus communities.
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Chapter 4
Game Theory and the Social Life of
Micro-organisms
4.1 Cooperation in Classic Game Theory
Cooperative phenomena in biology are di cult to treat because of the complexity and heterogeneity of the
interactions, but a qualitatively successful approach is cooperative game theory—the e↵ort to encapsulate
the complex interactions into parameters describing the binary outcome of pairwise interactions between
individuals [152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158]. The central element in game theory is the payo↵ matrix,
which describes the score accruing to each member of an interacting pair depending upon their action in the









Two players can either “cooperate” (C) or “defect” (D). Mutual cooperation yields a reward R, whilst if
both defect, they receive a punishment P . If one defects and the other cooperates, the defector receives
a temptation T while the cooperator receives the sucker’s payo↵ S. If T > R > P > S, then there is a
dilemma: a rational player would defect to receive the highest payo↵ independent of the state of the other
player, so that if both parties play rationally, each will end up with the punishment P . However, if they had
both cooperated, they would have received the reward R.
Two-body interactions are paradoxical in cooperative games, a forceful indicator of how collective e↵ects
can override selfish one-body behavior. If the payo↵ matrix instead obeyed the inequalities T > R > S > P ,
then the rational strategy is to do the opposite of the other player. This condition leads to the so-called
snowdrift game, which gives rise to the coexistence of both strategies
Classic game theory o↵ers an approach to explain the ubiquitous cooperative phenomena in nature:
Measure the payo↵ matrixes in various scenarios and justify that they fall in the regimes for cooperation.
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4.2 Cooperation in Laboratories
4.2.1 An RNA Virus
The approach in game theory is easier said than done because the elements in the payo↵matrixes, interpreted
as fitness or growth rates, are usually very hard to measure in the well-established cooperative animal world
such as monkeys, bats or fish [159]. However, empirical data come at last with technological advances in
microbiology. Such seemingly abstract games have biological realizations in the dynamics of microbes and
viruses.
In a pioneering study, Turner and Chao [160, 159] demonstrated that an RNA virus  6 is engaging in








In their experiment,  6 is a wild-type complete strain, capable of producing all the necessary intracellular
products for infection, and acts as a cooperator.  H2 is a mutant strain, which evolves a defector strategy
when cultured at high multiplicities-of-infection. During the co-infection of a microbial host by these two
strains, the fitness of the whole community increases initially, but drops eventually. The final drop is
unexpected because in evolution fitness usually increases. The dilemma can be explained using game theory.
By constructing the payo↵ matrix according to the measured mean fitness at di↵erent initial ratios of the
two strains, the authors showed that the virus was e↵ectively trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma, which
engendered the final drop.
To escape the dilemma of the phages, several years later, the same authors [161] cultured another strain








obeyed the inequalities T > R > S > P and so conformed to the condition for the so-called snowdrift game,
in which coexistence of the two strains were observed.
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4.2.2 Budding Yeast
In the above two experiments, the payo↵ matrices are measured, but not controlled. In a recent experiment,
a game theory payo↵ matrix was manipulated by genetically engineering Saccharomyces cerevisiae (budding
yeast) [13].
Budding yeast’s primary carbon intake is a monosaccharide, such as glucose and fructose. In a monosaccharide-
absent environment, dormant genes are derepressed to digest alternative nutrients, such as disaccharide mal-
tose and sucrose [162]. In the experiment, wild-type cooperator strains have an intact SUC2 gene, which
codes enzyme invertase to hydrolyze sucrose into glucose and fructose (Figure 4.1). However, 99% of the
product is released back into the media, giving rise to the possibility that mutant defectors with the SUC2
gene knocked out could make use of the metabolite without having to pay the price of manufacturing glucose.
In order to tune the cost of cooperation and hence the payo↵ matrix, the authors engineered cooperators to
be histidine auxotrophs, relying on histidine importation from the media. Having an intact histidine gene,
defectors are not a↵ected. Thus limitation of histidine concentration in the media coerces the metabolism of
cooperators, increases the cost of cooperation, and thus a↵ects the payo↵ matrix. By changing the glucose
and histidine concentration provided with a fixed portion of sucrose, the authors empirically obtained a
transition from the dominance of defectors, which corresponds to the prisoner’s dilemma, to the coexistence
of both strains, which is a snowdrift game (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.1: Enzyme invertase catalyzes sucrose hydrolysis into glucose and fructose. After Ref. [12].
The ability to manipulate collective properties of the microbial world by genetic engineering is impressive,
but what is lacking is a predictive understanding of the direct dependence of cooperator fraction on nutrition
concentrations.
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Figure 4.2: Coexistence of the two strains with variations in glucose and histidine concentration. After Ref.
[13]. (a) Cooperator fraction scaled in the color bar with variations in glucose and histidine concentration at
equilibrium. The black line is the boundary separating regimes for the prisoner’s dilemma (above the line)
and the snowdrift game (below the line). (b) Mean growth rate of the coculture with di↵erent glucose and
histidine concentration at equilibrium. The lines from top to bottom corresponds to histidine concentration
1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.01, and 0.005 (⇥ 20 µg ml 1), respectively.
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4.3 Theory of Cooperation in a Micro-organismal Snowdrift
Game
4.3.1 Goal
The purpose of this chapter is to build up a phenomenological model linking game theory and experimental
measurable quantities. We would like to calculate the population structure, i.e. the fraction for coopera-
tors and defectors, at di↵erent glucose and histidine concentrations, and reproduce the phase diagram for
the transition from dominance of a single strain to coexistence of both as shown in Figure 4.2(a). We
use phenomenological game theory because the collective e↵ects here are highly nonlinear due to complex
metabolism. Our model implies a consistent nonlinearity responsible for both yeast growth and glucose
production.
4.3.2 Model
Figure 4.3: Schematic of nutrient flows in the experiment of Ref. [13]. Sucrose is hydrolyzed in the periplas-
matic space (grey) of cooperators. The majority of the glucose produced di↵uses back to the media, from
which both strains import glucose. After Ref. [13].
The interactions between cooperator and defector strains are complicated for the following two reasons.
First, there are two kinds of nutritional molecules: sucrose and glucose as sketched in Figure 4.3. Sucrose is
55
easy to handle because it has a single source and single mode of consumption, originating from the media
and being consumed only by cooperators. However, glucose has two sources: the initial amount added
into the media, and the local increment from sucrose decomposition by cooperators. The actual glucose
concentration surrounding yeast cells depends on the cooperators’ metabolism and concentration, whose
relation is unknown. Second, in sucrose hydrolysis, cooperators experience a cost to synthesize invertase,
but at the same time gain in generating glucose for themselves. The balance between the cost and benefit
is subtle and hard to handle. In order to circumvent these two obstacles, we model a simple situation where
the two strains are at the same nutrition level. This should be applicable to the experimental situation
because cooperator strains ultimately live on the monosaccharide glucose no matter if it is absorbed from
the surrounding media or decomposed from sucrose. In this way, our system can be simplified as a coexistence
problem of two strains living on the same nutrition glucose.
Next we use game theory to identify the conditions for coexistence. The key is to construct a payo↵matrix
with experimental data. Here, the two strains are engaging in a cooperative game: if the payo↵ for defectors
exceeds that of cooperators, defectors will dominate; if the payo↵ for cooperators exceeds that of defectors,
cooperators will dominate. Therefore only when the payo↵s for both parties are equal, will coexistence be
achieved. The payo↵ for players is the mean fitness for strains, which is measured as the growth rate. Thus,
our next task is to construct the dependency of growth rates on experimental observable quantities. We do
this below using a mean field theory, modeled after the way in which cooperative interactions leading to
ferromagnetism are described by an e↵ective local field that adds to the externally applied magnetic field
(see, e.g. Ref. [163]).
The first input is the nonlinear dependency of growth rate b (hr 1) on glucose concentration g (%)
according to the experiment (Figure 4.4):
b =  1g
↵, (4.4)
where  1 = 0.44, ↵ = 0.15 and g is 0.001 ⇠ 0.03%. In Eq. (4.4), the growth rate b varies nonlinearly
with glucose concentration g. The nonlinear power ↵ is unusual, and reflects cellular constraints, such as the
nonlinear performance of hexose transporters and catabolic pathway enzymes. We cannot use first principles
system biology to justify the nonlinear ↵, because the basic metabolic networks etc. are not well enough
understood. Instead, we make a very simplified assumption: we interpret the nonlinearity as primarily
reflecting aspects of the e ciency of hexose transporters across the cell membrane. Hence Eq. (4.4) implies
that translocation flux rate through the membrane is proportional to the concentration raised to a nonlinear
power ↵. Note that in principle, such translocation processes are influenced by the metabolism of the cells,
but for now we regard that as negligible.
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Figure 4.4: Growth rate b (hr 1) varies nonlinearly with glucose concentration g (%) when there are only
defectors. After Ref. [13].
Second, we include the presence of cooperators. Now, there are two sources of glucose. Besides the initial
glucose added into the media, cooperators also produce glucose from sucrose decomposition. At the mean
field level, every cooperator manufactures glucose at about the same rate. We assume that this rate does
not have a significant dependence on the metabolism of cells; because the amount of invertase in each cell
is not influenced by the metabolism, we assume that the performance of invertase is also not significantly
influenced by the metabolism. Since the sucrose concentration is kept the same throughout the experiment,
there is no need for us to explore the detailed form of such a production rate. The total glucose produced
inside all the cooperator cells is thus proportional to the cooperator fraction f . Eq. (4.4) implies that the
glucose imported into the cell scales as g↵ due to the cellular constraints on the molecular translocation
process. The same translocation passage limits the glucose output from cooperators, as evidenced by the
report that the di↵usion coe cient through the cell wall is anomalously small, estimated to be 1/20 of that
in water [13]. Hence the flux of glucose released is proportional to the glucose produced inside the cells raised
to the power ↵. Since the glucose manufactured inside the cells is proportional to the cooperator fraction f ,
the glucose contribution from cooperators is proportional to f↵ with some coe cient of proportionality. We
denote the coe cient as  . As we note in the discussion about Eq. (4.4), the translocation process is a↵ected
by the metabolism of the cells. The coe cient  , in this way, represents a general discount factor due to
metabolism, which is a combined e↵ect of the artificial discount in histidine limitation and the natural cost
in cooperation. Including the contribution from cooperators as shown in Figure 4.5, we obtain the growth
rate for defectors
bd =  1(g +  f
↵)↵, (4.5)
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where   is a general discount factor that varies with histidine concentration, reflecting the artificial discount
in histidine limitation and the natural cost of cooperation.
Figure 4.5: Sketch of sources of glucose for defectors.
We would like to emphasize that we are proposing that the glucose increment is related to the cooperator
fraction instead of the absolute number of cooperators. There is a subtle di↵erence here, because the
defectors and the cooperators are competing for glucose. To see this, suppose that there are twice as many
defectors as cooperators: then, each defector can, in mean field theory, capture 0.5 of the production of
each cooperator. On the other hand, if there are equal numbers of defectors and cooperators, each defector
captures approximately the entire production of a cooperator.
Third, we analyze the situation for cooperators. Compared with defectors, when they import glucose
from the media, the translocation process is influenced by the metabolism as we learn from Eq. (4.4). Such a
discount, representing a combined e↵ect of the artificial discount in histidine limitation and the natural cost
in cooperation, is represented by the same   as in Eq. (2), because the same cellular processes are involved.
Thus we obtain
bc =   1(g +  f
↵)↵, (4.6)
where bc is the growth rate for cooperators. Last, we recall that there is a small amount of glucose that
cooperators reserve for themselves. This amount is determined by the sucrose concentration and the cell’s
metabolism and transport processes, which are mediated by the histidine concentration. Since the sucrose
concentration is always 5% during the experiment, we denote the benefit for a single cooperator cell by ⇣, a
single-variable function of histidine concentration only. Including this benefit for cooperation (Figure 4.6),
we finally obtain
bc =   1(g +  f
↵)↵ + ⇣. (4.7)
Eqs. (4.5) and (4.7) compose the central part of our model, including the contribution of cooperators
to the increase in glucose concentration by the term  f↵. This model balances the cost   for cooperators
with the benefit ⇣, both depending only on histidine concentrations. Note that as the cooperator fraction
f increases, more glucose is trapped in cooperators, but the amount per cooperator does not change. The
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Figure 4.6: Sketch of sources of glucose for cooperators.
positivity of ⇣ is essential for the survival of cooperators, which makes it possible for the two engineered
strains to engage in a snowdrift game.
4.3.3 Assumptions and Tests
In our model of cooperation, we have input three non-trivial arguments: (i) The two ↵’s in Eqs. (4.5) and
(4.7) are the same, representing the same translocation passage limitation on the glucose flux both into and
out of yeast cells; (ii) The two  ’s in Eq. (4.7) are the same, implying the same discount in yeasts’ growth
and sucrose decomposition by cost of cooperation mediated by histidine limitation; (iii) ⇣ is a single-variable
function of histidine concentration, representing that cooperators are compensated for production of glucose.
Our arguments above motivated points (i)-(iii) assuming that it is primarily the phenomenology of
transport of glucose through the cell membrane which is the growth-rate determining factor. However, in
principle, other metabolic e↵ects can be present. To test whether or not our assumptions are self-consistent
and represent a good representation of the data, we compare the predictions of our equations with the data.
Ideally, we would like to be able to calculate the cooperator fraction as a function of glucose and histidine
concentrations in Figure 4.2(a) from theory, but this would require a detailed description of the metabolism
and growth dynamics of the organisms to obtain the parameters. As an alternative approach, we input
experimental data to our equations and verify the consistency of our modeling by checking the standard
deviations for di↵erent sets of data. Based on our reasoning from game theory that the growth rates for
cooperators and defectors are the same at equilibrium, the measured growth rates of cocultures as a function
of glucose and histidine concentrations shown in Figure 4.2(b) should be valid for either strain. Interpreting
them as the growth rates for defectors, we can import the data in Figure 4.2 for various glucose and histidine
concentrations into Eq. (4.5) and calculate the discount  . According to our argument (i), we predict that  
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Table 4.1: Cost   for cooperators at various histidine concentrations.
[his]/(20 µg ml 1) 1 0.2 0.05 0.02
  0.19 0.14 0.061 0.027
standard deviation    0.02 0.02 0.006 0.006
should be the same at the same histidine concentration but di↵erent glucose concentrations; this is supported
by the standard deviations shown in Table 4.1. We neglect the data for very small cooperator fractions,
especially for the extinction of cooperators, such as those when histidine concentration is as low as 0.005,
since they will either generate large deviation with very small bias in measurement or cause the cooperation
term  f↵ to vanish. Averaging among di↵erent glucose concentrations, we can see that the discount   gets
smaller when histidine is more dilute. The first two    are calculated with six data points where glucose
concentration (%) ranges from 0.001 to 0.03. The latter two are smaller than the first two since fewer
data are averaged. The smallness of the standard deviations has not been hard-wired into our model, and
substantiates our assumption (i) because otherwise they might be orders of magnitude larger, as we will
illustrate as follows. We show in Table 4.2 the average of   and its corresponding standard deviation    if
the increment of glucose concentration varied not with the same power ↵ as we have assumed in our model,
but linearly with cooperator fraction, as we might have initially guessed,
bd =  1(g +  f)
↵, (4.8)
or even quadratically
bd =  1(g +  f
2)↵. (4.9)
The standard deviations    in Table 4.2 are at least two orders of magnitude larger than those in Table
4.1, and are even higher for the fit to Eq. (4.9) as shown in Table 4.3. The comparison among these
tables demonstrates that the standard deviation is a good test of our assumption, and hence justifies the
self-consistency of our theory.
Next, we interpret the data in Figure 4.2(b) as growth rates for cooperators and plug in the values of
  shown in Table 4.1 into Eq. (4.7). Our arguments (ii) and (iii) predict that ⇣ depends only on histidine
concentration, which is consistent with the standard deviation for ⇣ in Table 4.4. The benefit for cooperators
diminishes with the limitation in histidine. The latter two  ⇣ are bigger than the previous two since we
extend the data for those not incorporated in the calculation of   in Table 4.1. Overall, however, these
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Table 4.2: Large standard deviation    to fit Eq. (4.8) in violation of assumption (i).
[his]/(20 µg ml 1) 1 0.2 0.05 0.02
  1.8 12 12 8
standard deviation    1.5 9 7 4
Table 4.3: Large standard deviation    to fit Eq. (4.9) in violation of assumption (i).
[his]/(20 µg ml 1) 1 0.2 0.05 0.02
  5⇥10 4⇥103 8⇥103 9⇥103
standard deviation    6⇥10 7⇥103 8⇥103 6⇥103
consistency checks are successful, a result that we emphasize is not “built-in” to our theory.
Table 4.4: Benefit ⇣ for cooperators at various histidine concentrations.
[his]/(20 µg ml 1) 1 0.2 0.05 0.02
⇣ 0.269 0.260 0.241 0.222
standard deviation  ⇣ 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.02
4.3.4 Results
With the cost   and gain ⇣ in hand, we can now predict the cooperator fraction at equilibrium. Setting bd = bc
in Eq. (4.5) and (4.7), we plot the predicted cooperator fraction in Figure 4.7(a). As a comparison, we replot
the corresponding data from experiment [13] in Figure 4.7(b). Considering that the cooperator fraction
varies nearly 4 orders of magnitude, the similarity between the theoretical calculation and experimental
measurement is striking and supports our model.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a phenomenological model for wild-type cooperator and mutant defector
strains in a mixed media of glucose and sucrose. We circumvented the obstacle of modeling sucrose decom-
position, which increases glucose concentration, incurs a cost as invertase syntheses for cooperators, and
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Figure 4.7: (a) Theoretical result for cooperator fraction at various glucose and histidine concentrations. (b)
Corresponding experimental result for cooperator fraction at various glucose and histidine concentrations.
In both panels, the black line is the boundary separating regimes for the prisoner’s dilemma (above the line)
and the snowdrift game (below the line).
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rewards them with a small fraction of the glucose produced, by attributing cost and benefit for cooperation
to growth rates. Then we determined the dependency of growth rates for defectors and cooperators on
experimental quantities such as glucose and histidine concentrations. Despite our approximations, such as
averaging over di↵erent glucose concentrations, the resulting calculation of cooperator fraction at equilibrium
is consistent with experimental observations. So what did we actually predict? By requiring that bd = bc, we
thus found, in a non-circular way, the condition for the phase boundary separating the prisoner’s dilemma
phase from the snowdrift phase of the system. Our mean field arguments also predict the trend, i.e. the sign
of @f/@g for fixed histidine concentration. These methods could be useful in the design of future experiments




Cooperation in Evolutionary Game
Theory
5.1 Game Theory
As mentioned in Section 1.2, cooperation is widely observed at all levels of biology from human society to
other animals from organisms to cellular processes. Cooperation in biology is di cult to treat and often resort
to game theory, which abstracts complicated interactions into gain and loss in decision-making processes.
Interpreting economic concepts of gain and loss as evolutionary fitness after J.M. Smith and G.R. Price [164]
in 1973, evolutionary game theory has widely been used to explain cooperation in biology [165].








Each player can choose either to “cooperate” (C) or “defect” (D). The payo↵s correspond to the row player.
If both players cooperate, each receives a reward R. If both defect, each receives a punishment P . If one
cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator will get sucker’s payo↵ S while the defector will get the
temptation for defection T .
Prisoner’s dilemma requires that
T > R > P > S. (5.2)
In this scenario, a rational player would choose to defect if his opponent cooperates since T > R. He would
again choose to defect if his opponent defects since P > S. That being said, a rational player would always
defect irrespective of the strategy of his opponent. Since two rational players will follow the same logic,
the result is mutual defection. Now here is the dilemma: If both parties were to cooperate, both would be
rewarded rather than punished since R > P .
How to achieve cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma? The first mechanism is reciprocal altruism proposed
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by R.L. Trivers [166] and developed by R. Axelrod and W.D. Hamilton [167]. The basic idea is to play the
prisoner’s dilemma for repeated times, which is called iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) [168]. In IPD, each
player must take into account the potential impact of his current strategy on the strategies of his opponent
in the future. In the computer tournament of IPD in 1984 [168], the best strategy was “Tit-for-Tat”(TFT),
which cooperates in the first round and copies the opponent’s strategy in the previous round afterwards.
TFT has three feature: 1) It will not defect first. 2) It retaliates if the opponent defects. 3) It forgives
if the opponent started to cooperate again. In a world of TFTs, mutual cooperation is always achieved.
Furthermore, TFT tends to train the opponent to cooperate. The success of TFT represents the achievement
of cooperation. However, TFT does not score high facing totally random strategies [168]. What is more, as
R. Boyd and J.P. Lorberbaum showed [169], no deterministic strategy, including TFT, is evolutionary stable
in IPD. Other strategies such as generous TFT [170], which lowers the probability to retaliate, and Pavlov,
the win-stay and lose-shift strategy [171], have been designed, but more or less relies on TFT.
Nowak proposed the following five key rules for cooperation [155]: 1) Kin selection encourages coopera-
tion among relatives. 2) Direct reciprocity extends cooperation to unrelated individuals through expected
repeated interactions, which is also characterized as “I help you, you help me.” 3) Indirect reciprocity builds
up cooperation on the basis of reputation in human society so that “I help you, somebody else helps me.”
4) Network reciprocity provides more frequent interactions among network clusters considering spatial in-
homogeneity. 5) Group selection imposes multi-level selections favoring groups with more cooperators. All
the above five mechanisms can be established in a coherent mathematical framework by the inclusion of
potential benefit for an individual.
In 1992, M.A. Nowak and R.M. May [172] proposed spatial prisoner’s dilemma, which enables cooperators
to cluster and hence persist. The spatial structure promotes cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma [173], but
fails in the snowdrift game [174].
Various other attempts have been made to promote cooperation such as continuous prisoner’s dilemma
[175, 176], players with di↵erent ability to spread their strategies [177, 178], and complex networks [179, 180].
F.C. Santos and J.M. Pacheco [181] shows in scale-free networks that strong correlation between individuals
enhances cooperation. A. Melbinger [182] couples evolution in population structure with growth dynamics.
In all versions of model seeking cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma, the key point is to increase the
frequency of contact among cooperators beyond the population average.
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Figure 5.1: Di↵erence between a fixed landscape and a dynamic landscape. The orange oval indicates the
population. Purple cylinders of di↵erent hights indicate di↵erent fitness on the landscape. a) Evolution
of the population adapting to a fixed landscape. The population moves to the cylinder with the highest
fitness. b) Evolution of the population adapting to a dynamic landscape. The adaptation of the population
changes the landscape. The population moves to the cylinder with the highest fitness, but not necessarily
the previous one.
5.2 Dynamic Landscape
However, such mechanisms either work in a fixed landscape or do not put enough emphasis on the importance
of a dynamic landscape, while in reality, the evolution of organisms is tightly coupled with the evolution
of their environment (Figure 5.1). On one hand, organisms compete with each other for survival and
reproduction. Mutation and selection are two mechanisms that enable and push organisms to adapt to their
environment. These are driving forces for evolution of organisms in a fixed landscape, where a population
moves toward a fitness maximum as shown in Figure 5.1(a).
On the other hand, each individual or species serves as an evolutionary background for other individuals
and species. The simplest scenario here is the coevolution of two organisms such as the arms race between
bacterium Pseudomonas fluorescens SBW25 and its DNA phage SBW25 2 as investigated by A. Buckling et
al. [183]. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the general trend as ascending both in bacterial resistance and phage in-
fectivity in approximately 400 generations during 50 transfers. Viewing bacterium Pseudomonas fluorescens
SBW25 as the target organism and the phage SBW25 2 as its evolutionary background, we can see that
during the improvement of bacterial resistance, phage infectivity, which is the landscape, also evolves with
time, and vice versa. This is an example of coevolution of two, which can be extended to three and much
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Figure 5.2: Coevolution between bacteria Pseudomonas fluorescens SBW2 and its phage SBW2 2. After
Ref. [14]. (a) Increased bacterial resistance with time (transfer number) to sympatric phage populations.
Di↵erent lines indicate di↵erent phage transfers. (b) Increased phage infectivity with time (transfer number)
to sympatric bacteria populations. Di↵erent lines indicate di↵erent bacteria transfers.
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more. Hence, the adaptive procedures of organisms react back onto the environment so that the environment
is shaped by adaptations of organisms. For example, microbiota, which is beneficial to human health [184],
coexist and compete with pathogens in the same niche. Taking antibiotics kills pathogens as well as the
beneficial microbiota. The emergence of certain antibiotic resistance in the beneficial microbiota may seed
the fast spread of resistance genes by horizontal gene transfer, so that it is not long before pathogens in the
same niche acquire that kind of antibiotic resistance. Out of control by antibiotics, the burst in pathogen
population will aggravate the living pressure of the microbiota in their competition for limited resources and
space. Hence evolution should be tackled in a dynamic landscape, in which the fitness maximum in phase
space may change with time as illustrated in Figure 5.1(b).
Figure 5.3: Comparison of fitness between two eventual winner (EW) and two eventual loser (EL) clones
relative to the ancestor of the E. coli EW1 and EW2 take over the population despite their initial lower
fitness compared to EL1 and EL2. After Ref. [15].
In this way, as we see it, evolutionary game theory might shed light on the long-time conundrum of the
maintenance of cooperation because 1) the fitness maximum may change with time and 2) some transient
states rather than the fitness maximum may be favored during evolution. These transient states are not any
state, but some special ones promising to reach some fitness maximum in the long term with the evolution of
the dynamic landscape. In other words, the ability to evolve, i.e. evolvability, is another criterion in evolution
besides fitness. For example, R.J. Woods et al. [15] demonstrated in a population of Escherichia coli that two
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clones with greater potential for future adaptation, despite their lower initial fitness, eventually outcompete
another two after 1000 generations (Figure 5.3). In protein dynamics [185], conformational diversity such
as fluctuations of side chains and exchange of second structures, providing new folds and functions, may be
favored instead of a single but fixed structure. D.J. Earl and M.W. Deem [186] also showed theoretically
that evolvability is a selectable trait during evolution. Therefore selection for fitness and evolvability in a
dynamics landscape may enrich the context of evolutionary game theory.
5.3 Stochastic Decision Making
Furthermore, stochasticity is ubiquitous in nature and has attracted much attention. In most of the previous
models, stochastic characteristics are, generally speaking, introduced through two schemes. The first is
mutation at reproduction, which introduces random drift in o↵springs’ behaviors. The second is stochastic
update rules [187] in contrast to the deterministic substitution by the best performer among all candidate
strategies. Commonly used stochastic update rules include imitation of the better, where a player adopts a
strategy with a probability proportional to the di↵erence between its own score and better performers, and
proportional update, which compares its own score with all candidates so that a downgrade to an inferior
strategy is possible. These stochastic update rules at some level keep the diversity of strategies.
However, we would like to emphasize here another level of stochasticity: stochastic decision making.
Such a decision making process is well-studied in the design of strategies in computer tournaments. A
famous tournament is the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) [167, 168], where two players will play the
prisoner’s dilemma for repeated times so that each player must take into account the potential impact of
his current strategy on the strategies his opponent might choose in the future. Among various strategies in
the tournament, one design is totally random irrespective of previous rounds. Although the random design
does not win the tournament, the best deterministic strategy “Tit-for-Tat”, where a player cooperates in
the first round and copies the previous strategy of his opponent afterwards, could not score high against it.
Stochastic decision making, favoring the maintenance of diversity in strategies, should be included in the
seek for cooperation in game theory.
In biology, the map from genotype to phenotype is not one-to-one rigidly and rigorously [188]. Instead,
there are high levels of stochasticity in the gene expression processes, such as transcription and translation.
Genomes have neither the unique nor final words. Their expression is influenced by the environment. What
is more, such influence may be so large as to alter the phenotypes [189, 16]. Therefore, we think it is
important to endow both genotype and phenotype to each player in the game, the same way as nature does.
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5.4 Stochastic Decision Making Strategy Evolving in a Dynamic
Landscape
Now in the framework of evolutionary game theory, we propose a novel stochastic decision making mechanism
encouraging cooperation beyond Nowak’s five rules [155].
5.4.1 Dynamic Landscape in Game Theory
As we see in Section 5.1, if the payo↵ matrix satisfies Relation (5.2), it is a prisoner’s dilemma. If the
condition changes to the following one
T > R > S > P, (5.3)
it is called a snowdrift game. This time a rational player would still defect if his opponent cooperates, but
he would switch to cooperate if his opponent defects since S > P . In this case, the optimal strategy is the
opposite of the opponent. Hence the outcome is the coexistence of both strategies. So there is diversity.
As illustrated by prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game, the payo↵ matrix defines the landscape
of organisms because it is the rule for the game. The status of payo↵ matrix in game theory is similar to
that of the Hamiltonian in physics systems, which determines the kinetics. A time-independent Hamiltonian
provides a fixed landscape while a time-dependent one provides a dynamic landscape. If the problem were to
be solved using a Hamiltonian, we would need to figure out how the Hamiltonian would evolve. Similarly, a
constant payo↵ matrix corresponds to a fixed landscape while a varying one provides a dynamics landscape,
which is exactly what we are looking for. So here is our first question: How should the payo↵ matrix vary?
5.4.2 Stochastic Phenotype in Game Theory
The second issue we need to address is the stochastic behaviors of players. The choice of strategies for each
player is not necessarily determined at birth, and subject to environmental conditions and even the stochas-
ticity in the environmental conditions. P.J. Choi et al.’s work in 2008 [16] is a good example illustrating
both scenarios.
In their experiment, Escherichia coli cells are genetically engineered with two phenotypes as shown in
Figure 5.4: 1) Uninduced cells with none or limited number of spotted fluorescence and 2) induced cells with
highly fluorescent membranes. The production of permease, which is labeled with a yellow fluorescent protein
(YFP), controls phenotype switching and lactose metabolism as well [190, 191]. At low inducer concentrations
(Figure 5.5), partial dissociation of the tetrameric lactose repressor is followed by a fast rebinding, generating
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Figure 5.4: Two phenotypes in genetically engineered Escherichia coli cells in the presence of 30µM lactose
analog methyl-b-D-thiogalactoside (TMG) inducer. Uninduced cells: none or limited number of spotted
fluorescence. Induced cells: highly yellow fluorescent membranes. Upper panel dimensions 8µm ⇥13µm.
Lower panel dimensions 31µm ⇥31µm. After Ref. [16].
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Figure 5.5: Dissociation of the lacose repressor at low and high inducer concentrations. Upper panel: At
low inducer concentrations, partial dissociation is followed by a fast rebinding, yielding a small number
of transcription. The lac operon is not induced. Lower panel: At high inducer concentrations, complete
dissociation leads to a burst in transcription. The lac operon is induced. After Ref. [16].
Figure 5.6: A time-lapse sequence demonstrating phenotype switching in Escherichia coli. At an intermediate
concentration of intracellular inducer (50µM TMG), the majority of the cells keep uninduced over the period,
but one cell triggers induction of its lac operon by expressing many permease so that its phenotype changes
from uninduced, which is dark, to highly fluorescence of yellow at time 30 minutes. After Ref. [16].
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Figure 5.7: Dissociation of the lacose repressor at intermediate inducer concentrations. Partial dissociation
is usually followed by a fast rebinding, yielding a small number of transcription, where the lac operon is not
induced. Sometimes stochastic complete dissociation leads to a burst in transcription and the lac operon is
induced. After Ref. [16].
no more than one transcript. The lac operon not induced, these cells are incapable of lactose metabolism. A
small number of permease is synthesized, yielding limited number of spotted fluorescence. On the contrary,
at high inducer concentrations, complete dissociation of the lactose repressor triggers positive feedback in
permease expression. Induction of the lac operon enables lactose metabolism. Large burst of permease results
in highly fluorescent membranes. Hence the all-or-none fluorescence phenotype is more than a toy switch
in the micro-organismal wonderland. It visualizes the intrinsic state of the lac operon and the capability
of the cell to metabolize lactose. The all-or-none fluorescence of the same cell at high and low inducer
concentrations demonstrates environmentally determined phenotypes.
The more intriguing case is at intermediate concentrations. Figure 5.4 shows the coexistence of both
phenotypes in a genetically identical population at 30µM lactose analog methyl-b-D-thiogalactoside (TMG),
which indicates stochasticity in environmental conditions. Furthermore, Figure 5.6 records a time-lapse
sequence of phenotype switching of an Escherichia coli cell at 50µM TMG. As Figure 5.7 illustrates, at
intermediate concentrations, usually partial dissociation of the repressor is followed by a quick rebinding,
but stochastic complete dissociation is able to induce the lac operon and lead to a large burst of permease
production, yielding high fluorescence. Hence phenotype switching of the same cell as time goes on in the
same media suggests stochasticity in environmentally determined phenotypes.
In order to account for the stochastic phenotypes in biology, we need another degree of freedom in our
model of game theory. Whether a player is to cooperate or defect, in our eyes, is a phenotype, similar to the
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all-or-none fluorescence. In order to separate genotype from phenotype, we need another level of description.
So the second question is how to properly incorporate genotype?
5.4.3 Scheme
Figure 5.8 sketches a scheme of our answer to the above two combined questions: Stochastic phenotype in
an evolutionary landscape. The top row emphasizes that evolution and ecology interact with each other.
In the left branch, evolution imprints in the genome. Genotype, to a large extent, determines phenotype,
still subject to external conditions. At the genotype level, each player has a gene pc, which stands for the
probability to cooperate. At the phenotype level, each player chooses its strategy based on the comparison
of its gene pc with a random variable each time drawn independently from an identical uniform distribution.
The player will defect only when the latter exceeds the former; otherwise it will cooperate. In this way, we
have distinguished genotype from phenotype explicitly. As in biology, reproduction passes on genotypes to
descendants. We would like to emphasize the stochasticity embedded in our model here, which is significantly
di↵erent from most of the previous models: Even coded by the same genotype, di↵erent players may have
di↵erent choices of strategies, i.e. di↵erent phenotypes. Up to now, we have obtained a genuine stochastic
model and answered the second question of the proper separation of genotype and phenotype. In the right
branch, ecology is the fitness landscape for organisms. Using the language in game theory, it is the rule for
the game, i.e. the payo↵ matrix. As we mentioned earlier, ecology is shaped by the adaption of organisms.
Such an adaptation should be an emergent phenomenon, or in other words, a collective characteristic of the
phenotypes for the whole community. Since the phenotypes are either to cooperate or defect, as a collective
quantity, the cooperator fraction, in our view, serves as a good candidate to drive the dynamics of the
landscape, i.e. the evolutionary ecology. Hence we require that the payo↵ matrix evolve with the cooperator
fraction, which is our answer to the first question for the variation of the rule.
5.5 Evolving Prisoner’s Dilemma
5.5.1 Model









Figure 5.8: Scheme of the stochastic phenotype in evolutionary landscape.
where f is the cooperator fraction, c and d are the contribution from a cooperator and a defector, respectively,
and ⌘ is the portion a cooperator reserves for itself. Without cooperator fraction f , it would be a usual payo↵
matrix where a defector simply grabs (1  ⌘)c from the cooperator and keeps its own d when encountering
a cooperator. When f is multiplied, every element in the payo↵ matrix evolves, which provides a dynamic
landscape. Does such a discount f make sense? According to J. Gore et al.’s experiment [17] (Figure
5.9) , cooperative yeasts grow much faster at high density than at low density in a sucrose culture. Since
sucrose hydrolysis demands a cost from cooperators, the faster growth rate indicates higher contribution
from cooperators at a higher cooperator fraction. It is a positive e↵ect encouraging cooperation. Although
the relation in experiment might not be linear, as a simplification, we multiply the contribution by f , and
extend the multiplication factor to the whole payo↵ matrix to guarantee that the game remains in the regime
of prisoner’s dilemma no matter what cooperator fraction f is.
In our simulation, we choose
c = 11, (5.5a)
d = 2, (5.5b)
⌘ = 0.1. (5.5c)
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Figure 5.9: Wildtype budding yeasts grow much faster at high cell density than at low density in a 5%
sucrose culture. After Ref. [17].
It satisfies the criterion for prisoner’s dilemma (relation (5.2)) irrespective of the specific value of f except
when cooperators extinct f = 0.
We perform simulations on a 513⇥513 lattice. The initial condition is a uniform distribution from 0 to 1
for all the genotypes, which interprets as a uniform range for the probability to cooperate from unconditional
defectors to unconditional cooperators. At each round, a random number is generated to decide every player’s
phenotype, either to cooperate or defect, according to its genotype, which is the probability for cooperation.
With all the phenotypic strategies determined, we update the payo↵ matrix with the current cooperator
fraction. Next every player will play the game according to the current payo↵ matrix with its eight nearest
neighbors on the lattice, and accumulate its score. Our lattice update is a Moran process [192, 193] with a
constant update rate. Moran processes are commonly used in the dynamics of competing individuals while
keeping the total population as a finite constant. As illustrated in Figure 5.10, each player is randomly
chosen to be substituted by an o↵spring according to the update rate, which implies a fixed death rate for
each player. When a player dies, its new-born descendant will compare the progenitor’s accumulated score
with the eight nearest neighbors, and inherit the genotype of the best performer. Then the round restarts.
We would like to emphasize two points here, which is absent in previous models. (i) Even with the same
set of neighbors’ strategies, the same player’s payo↵ is not unique, still depending on its own stochastic
phenotype. (ii) A descendant inherits the genotype of the best performer, but not the best strategy, nor
the best strategy combination, which is a sequence of cooperation and defection, because the phenotypic
behavior is a sequence of stochastic decision making process. In this way, by explicitly separating genotype
from phenotype, we have built up a simple stochastic evolutionary game theory model, where phenotype
is selected by the fitness landscape, i.e. the rules, and at the same time, shapes the landscape through
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Figure 5.10: Sketch of the Moran process for stochastic evolution in a finite population of constant size. At
each time step, an individual is randomly chosen to reproduce with a probability proportional to its score or
fitness. Another individual is chosen to die. The o↵spring of the first replaces the second. Black and white
dots indicate di↵erent species. After Ref. [18].
a collective power of the community, while genotype sits back of the phenotype and passes on through
inheritance. Such a stochastic evolutionary mechanism is a minimal miniature of the nature.
5.5.2 Results
Figure 5.11 shows two snapshots for a simulation on evolving prisoner’s dilemma at di↵erent time steps where
cooperator fraction is 87.3% and 87.4%, respectively. Yellow dots represent cooperators and blue ones are
defectors. Although the cooperator fraction is close to each other, the two snapshots significantly deviate in
the scattering pattern of defectors and cooperators. These two snapshots are taken at approximately 20,000
time steps. It has long past the transition period, which is the first 30 time steps. The cooperator fraction
has approached a semi-fixed point, but still keeps changing slightly. The pattern continuously evolves as the
two snapshots contrast. Hence it displays a highly dynamic and forever-evolving system.
In Figure 5.11, the lattice update rate is 100% and the system reaches a coexistence of cooperators and
defectors. We would like to compare it to Figure 5.12, where we decrease the lattice update rate to 1%
and 50%, respectively, in order to demonstrate the selection advantage. The overwhelming dominance of
cooperators in a prisoner’s dilemma game is out of expectation. In a classic spatial game theory model,
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Figure 5.11: Simulation on evolving prisoner’s dilemma for lattice update rate 100%. Yellow dots are
cooperators and blue ones are defectors. The left and right panels are at di↵erent time steps with cooperator
fraction 87.3% and 87.4%, respectively. The simulation runs on a 513⇥ 513 lattice while the two snapshots
contrast the same top-left corner to demonstrate the forever-evolving feature of the patterns.
Figure 5.12: Simulation on evolving prisoner’s dilemma for lattice update rates 1% (left panel) and 50%
(right panel), respectively. Yellow dots are cooperators and blue ones are defectors. The cooperator fractions
are both 99.9%. The simulation runs on a 513⇥513 lattice while the two snapshots contrast the same top-left
corner to demonstrate the influence of details in evolutionary game theory on patterns.
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little di↵erence is observed in the phase diagram for cooperation fraction between the synchronized and
asynchronized lattice updates [187]. Here the huge di↵erence between Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 illustrates
the subtlety in evolutionary game, where details of the game such as the update rate here are important
[194].
5.5.3 Discussion: Timescale
Generally speaking, evolution is recognized on a long timescale. Adaption to the environment, emergence
and fixation of new genotypes, and speciation of di↵erent lineages are achieved through many generations.
This classic scenario corresponds to a slow lattice update rate, where advantageous strains are endowed with
enough opportunities to take over the whole community.
Table 5.1: Genetic di↵erentiation at six microsatellite loci between beach residents, river residents, and
beach immigrants. D: Nei’s unbiased genetic distance. FST : fixation index. GD: genotypic di↵erentiation.
Ssa85: locus that best di↵erentiated river residents from beach residents with FST = 0.054. Huge di↵erence
in genetic di↵erentiation identifies beach residents and river residents as two ecotypes. After Ref. [3].
However, fast selection, where selection is quicker than interactions among individuals, or with their
environment [194], is also reasonable and supported by recent experimental discoveries [195, 196, 197, 198].
For example, A.P. Hendry et al. [87] o↵ered evidence for reproductive isolation in an introduced sockeye
salmon descending from a common ancestry after within only 13 generations. Two distinct ecotypes are
identified in salmon inhabiting Cedar River and a Lake Washington beach with a geographical separation
of 7 km. Table 5.1 compares genetic di↵erentiation at six microsatellite loci between 3 salmon populations
as beach residents, river residents, and beach immigrants. Figure 5.13 compares their male body depth,
which is sexually selected, and female body length, which is important to protect eggs in flooding. The
huge genotypic and phenotypic di↵erence between beach and river residents in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.13,
respectively, establishes their reproductive isolation.
Micro-organisms also exhibit rapid evolution in predator-prey systems. M.A. Du↵y and L. Sivars-Becker
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of (A) standardized male body depth and (B) female body length between beach
residents (BR), beach immigrants (BI), and river residents (RR). Boxes contain 50% of the data and bars for
the remainder. Horizontal lines, arrows and the circle indicate medians, means, and an outlier, respectively.
Huge di↵erence in both male body depth and female body length for BR and RR identifies them as two
ecotypes. After Ref. [3].
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Figure 5.14: Coevolution between bacteria Pseudomonas fluorescens and its phage  2. After Ref. [14]. (a)
Each line represents bacterial resistance to past, contemporary and future sympatric phage populations. The
negative slope shows increased phage infectivity. (b) Each lines represents resistance of past, contemporary
and future bacterial to a given sympatric phage population. The positive slope shows increased bacterial
resistance.
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[3] reported that Daphnia dentifera from lakes with recent epidemics were more resistant to infection by
its parasite Metschnikowia bicuspidata. M.A. Brockhurst et al. [199] systematically investigated coevolution
between bacteria Pseudomonas fluorescens and its lytic phage  2 for 120 generations during 16 transfers.
Figure 5.14 shows coevolution of phage infectivity and bacteria resistance in the predator-prey systems.
The decreased bacterial resistance to past, contemporary and future phage (Figure 5.14 (a)) demonstrates
improved phage infectivity while the increased bacteria resistance of past, contemporary and future transfers
to a given sympatric phage population (Figure 5.14 (b)) manifests improved bacteria resistance. Hence rapid
evolution is visible between di↵erent transfers, each containing 7.5 generations on average.
Besides, in social and cultural evolution, the timescales of selection and interaction are comparable to
each other [194].
Therefore, di↵erent lattice update rates map to di↵erent reasonable scenarios. Our results show that
slow and intermediate (Figure 5.12) selection are more promising to encourage cooperation compared to fast
selection (Figure 5.11). In other words, the keynote in nature encourages cooperation!
5.5.4 Discussion: Origin of Cooperation
According to the classic game theory, defection is both a Nash equilibrium and an evolutionary stable
strategy in the regime of prisoner’s dilemma. Large e↵orts have been devoted to promote cooperation [175,
200, 174, 201]. Unexpectedly, our model presents something more startling. It might yield the dominance
of cooperation subject to the update rate of the lattice. However, defectors in our model will never have a
chance to dominate the whole community. The striking di↵erence between our model and classic prisoner’s
dilemma models raises two questions. First, what is the key mechanism that supports coexistence? Second,
what is the origin of the dominance of cooperators? These two questions, in fact, both root in the origin of
cooperation.
As a comparison, we perform a simulation with the stochastic behaviors of players but without the
feedback of the community onto ecology, which is the fixed landscape. We see that coexistence is still
achieved but the cooperator fraction drops to 20 ⇠ 40%. Therefore, the coexistence of the cooperators
and defectors attributes to the separation of genotype and phenotype as sketched in Figure 5.8, while the
dominance of cooperators results from the evolving rules.
In order to further illustrate the origin of cooperation in more details, we track the evolution for the
distribution of cooperator fractions as shown in Figure 5.15. We can see that initially cooperator fraction
drops as more unconditional or nearly unconditional defectors, with low cooperation probability, mushroom,
which is consistent with the classic selection advantage of defectors. The rapid diminishing of unconditional
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Figure 5.15: Distribution of the probability to cooperate at di↵erent time steps in evolving prisoner’s
dilemma. Time elapses from a) to f). a) Time at 0. b) Time at 1. c) Time at 3. d) Time at 11. e)
Time at 50. f) Time at 28329.
83
or nearly unconditional cooperators, with high cooperation probability, leaves fewer players to be exploited
by those more selfish individuals. What is worse for these selfish individuals, they tend to cluster due to
the nearby reproduction. As a result, they are soon superseded by random individuals with cooperator
fraction near 50%. This illustrates the key role of stochasticity in phenotype determination: Although
unconditional or nearly unconditional cooperators are vulnerable to unconditional or nearly unconditional
defectors, random individuals are able to survive (Figure 5.15(b)), which serves as a reservior for cooperative
phenotypes. Cooperators, on the contrary to defectors, benefit from clustering with each other. Furthermore
as payo↵ matrix (5.4) shows, the reward for cooperation increases with cooperator fraction. In other words,
altruism is advantageous to avoid exploitation by defectors. Such a positive feedback favors coopertors, so
the peak of the population moves to higher and higher cooperation probability as shown in Figure 5.15(c)
⇠ (f), and the cooperator fraction continues to rise, too. When will it stop? It depends on the details of the
model for equilibrium such as the update rates shown in Figure 5.11 and 5.12. Therefore, despite the initial
boom of defectors, cooperators at last dominate the whole community.
In short, stochastic phenotype determination maintains the coexistence of cooperation and defection,
while the evolutionary landscape pumps up cooperator fractions.
5.6 Other Evolving Games
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with the same set of parameters (5.5). In both games, not only coexistence but also the same level of
cooperator fraction as in the evolving prisoner’s dilemma, is achieved.
Therefore, in an evolving stochastic game, the payo↵ matrix alone is far from enough to determine the
fate of the whole community. Stochasticity embedded in the phenotype determination process encourages
84
cooperation. Since the stochastic phenotype mechanism mimics the universal stochasticity in gene expression,
such as transcription and translation, our models demonstrate that the cooperator fraction alone is not
enough to reveal the competition type, whether it is prisoner’s dilemma or snowdrift game, among individuals.
In other word, stochastic phenotype masks the type of rules in nature.
5.7 Comparison with Previous Models
Last, we would like to compare our model to previous ones. The same in classic game theory, but di↵erent
from iterated games, our players have no memory either of their opponents’ or their own’s previous pheno-
types (or strategies). However, their payo↵ is a↵ected by the community as a whole through the cooperator
fraction f in the evolving matrix. This attributes to the dynamic landscape. Although not correlated in
time, each player’s phenotype is determined by the same genotype through its life span. The stochastic phe-
notype di↵erentiates our plays from classic plays. This attributes to the stochastic phenotype determination
process. Hence our players are somewhere between classic players and iterated ones.
Furthermore, by incorporating cooperator fraction f in the payo↵ matrix, we provide a mean field level
background to every individual, similar to inserting the magnetization in the e↵ective field in the Ising
model. In this way, the cooperative or defective phenotypes of individuals a↵ect the population. In other
words, cooperation benefits the whole community as the elements in the payo↵ matrixes (5.4), (5.6), and
(5.7) increase with higher cooperator fraction. The positive feedback pumps up the cooperator fraction.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a novel stochastic mechanism encouraging cooperation in evolutionary game
theory. We have successfully achieved high cooperation fractions in the community even when the govern-
ing rule falls in the regime of prisoner’s dilemma, let alone other rules. Such dominance of cooperation,
irrespective of the detailed type of rules, is consistent with the wide observation of cooperation in nature.
Our mechanism significantly stresses stochasticity in the map from genotype to phenotype, and evolutionary
landscape, with which di↵erent rules such as prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift game yield comparable co-
operator fractions. Therefore, cooperator fraction, as a collective and emergent quantity, is not necessarily
determined by the detailed type of competition, but rather may subject to stochastic phenotype and evolu-
tionary landscape, which are able to mask the underlying type of competition. Such a landscape provides
altruisms an alternative way to escape exploitation by defectors.
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Chapter 6
Evolutionary Robust Strategies for
Delivery of Antibiotics
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Challenge, Innovation and Impact
For more than half a century, treatments against bacterial infections have focused primarily on delivering
classes of molecule that are broadly toxic to the bacteria in the human body. However, this approach is not
sustainable because microbial communities can share antibiotic resistance genes through a variety of mecha-
nisms of horizontal gene transfer [58]. Recently it was discovered that horizontal gene transfer rates between
pathogenic and commensal Enterobacteriaceae may be boosted by up to several orders of magnitude in gut
inflammation [202]. Frequent horizontal gene transfer leads to unexpectedly rapid emergence of antibiotic
resistance and even multidrug resistance (MDR) [203, 204]. For example, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA), which is resistant to a wide range of drugs such as aminoglycosides, macrolides, tetracy-
cline, chloramphenicol, and lincosamides besides the commonly known methicillin [205], was estimated in
2005 [206] with an incidence rate of 31.8 per 100,000 and mortality rate of 6.3 per 100,000, i.e., about 95,000
cases and 19,000 deaths every year in the United States. Vancomycin is empirically most frequently used
to treat MRSA infections [206], but its minimum inhibiting concentration (MIC) has significantly increased
for clinical isolates over the years [207]. Vancomycin-resistant S. aureus (VRSA) [208] ascends as a new
clinical challenge [204]. What is worse, emergence of MDR and extensively-drug-resistant (XDR), which
is resistant to at least 3 out of 6 classes of drugs, Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MDR-TB and XDR-TB) is
rising worldwide [120]. Totally drug-resistant (TDR) tuberculosis was reported and documented in Italy in
2007 [209], Iran in 2009 [210, 211] and India in 2011 [212, 213]. The return of dark ages before the discovery
of antibiotics is looming on the horizon.
The innovations presented here are smart strategies, based upon a quantitative understanding of the evo-
lutionary response of bacterial communities. If successful they could provide a new paradigm and transform
our approach to treating diseases with an evolutionary or collective component, a class that includes not
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just bacterial infections but also cancer and HIV.
6.1.2 Rationale
Our proposed strategies are radically di↵erent from current practice [204]. First, conventional strategies
using broad-spectrum antibiotics do not di↵erentiate between the pathogens and the beneficial microbiota
that are normally resident in our bodies. This population vastly outnumbers the invasive pathogens, at least
at the beginning of an infection, and can help suppress the infection by competing with the pathogens for
limited resources of nutrients, thereby dominating the carrying capacity of the host ecosystem (e.g. the gas-
trointestinal tract). Furthermore, under exposure to antibiotics, this beneficial population becomes enriched
in antibiotic resistance genes, which can be readily transmitted to the pathogens. The widely-recognized
conclusion is that the next generation antibiotics should be selective, either narrow-spectrum which target
pathogens and Gram-positive beneficial bacteria, or ultra-narrow-spectrum, which target pathogens only.
However, this is not su cient to avoid the eventual emergence of antibiotic resistance, although it will
delay the onset according to our preliminary calculations. Instead, we propose to minimize the possible
influence of antibiotic resistance genes by applying a negligible selective pressure to the pathogens. Our
idea begins with the observation that, in many cases, pathogens use quorum sensing to coordinate their
attack when they are su ciently numerous [214]. Our working hypothesis is that we can interfere with
quorum sensing channels, but instead of trying to suppress these channels as other works have proposed
[215, 216, 217, 218], we will attempt to amplify these signals. Our rationale is that we can thereby induce the
premature expression of virulence factors! Although counter-intuitive, this will have the e↵ect of imposing
a substantial metabolic load on the pathogens, slowing their growth and further limiting their ability to
occupy a biochemical niche in the host. Our preliminary calculations suggest that all these e↵ects prevent
the proliferation of pathogens, and when combined with the subsequent and timely application of a single
dose of ultra-narrow-spectrum antibiotics can completely suppress the pathogen population before antibiotic
resistance genes have spread and before the virulence has reached clinically problematic levels.
6.1.3 Approach
Our plan to attack the challenge of emerging antibiotic resistance has two independent strategies: 1) Narrow-
ing down the spectrum of antibiotics in order to target pathogens precisely and 2) quorum sensing spoofing
so as to incur the huge cost on pathogens in virulence factor pre-expression. We design theoretical models
to investigate the e↵ectiveness of both strategies and then combine them into an advanced therapy as an
evolutionary robust strategy for the delivery of antibiotics. To our knowledge, this sort of two-step treat-
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ment cycle has never been proposed in this context, and it di↵ers from all existing approaches in that it
will not promote the transmission of antibiotic resistance, and will leave largely intact the hosts beneficial
microbiota. It addresses the problem of horizontal gene transfer and the transmission of antibiotic resistance
genes, and as such would represent a major advance if successful.
Our approach presents a significant innovation, a novel treatment, and an ambitious attack on the
antibiotic resistance problem, significantly departing from current biomedical research undertaken elsewhere.
We focus on collective properties such as the response of bacterial communities to antibiotics by their
transmission of antibiotic resistance genes, which is a systems or population level phenomenon. The outcome
of collective properties is always hard to predict a priori, because of multistability: there are typically a
number of possible outcomes, and which one actually occurs is determined by the phase diagram of the
system, in other words, the interplay between the di↵erent forces active in the system.
In more detail, these forces include the ecological competition between the pathogens and the indigenous
bacteria, the dependence of expression of virulence factor on the concentration of quorum sensing molecules,
the rate of interspecies horizontal gene transfer and so on. As a result, one must calculate the dynamical
behavior of these complex systems and identify, even semi-quantitatively, regions of parameter space where
the outcomes are biomedically desirable. In this regard, our approach di↵ers from existing approaches
wherein candidate pathways are targeted and the level of systems biology that needs to be quantitatively
understood is relatively low: a molecule will either have the desired e↵ect or it won’t — but there is no
“tuning parameter” other than dose which can be varied in the treatment.
In order to explore the parameter space relevant to each of our components, it is essential to perform
individual-level population dynamics simulations of the interactions between the pathogens, the beneficial
microbiota, the quorum sensing molecules, and the antibiotic resistance genes, taking into account their
possible horizontal transfer. Preliminary results from such simulations shaped the innovative approach we
pursue in this chapter and we discuss these simulations below in more detail to motivate our strategy for
overcoming the key obstacles presented by the emergence of antibiotic resistance. Their outcome is, however,
simple to state: we were unable to find a single-step drug treatment that could eliminate pathogens and
not give rise to the emergence of antibiotic resistance at large in the population. A more positive way
of stating our conclusion is that the narrow- and ultra-narrow-spectrum antibiotics do delay the onset of
the emergence of population-wide antibiotic resistance compared with broad-spectrum antibiotics, but the
di↵erence is not qualitative. In a second round of computer simulations, we found that a two-step drug
treatment schedule, involving modulating the concentration of quorum sensing molecules, was able to both
prevent the emergence of antibiotic resistance at the population level and eliminate the pathogens, at least
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as far as is possible given the potential presence of persisters. This innovative strategy, which forms the bulk
of our e↵ort, is described below.
6.2 Narrowing Down the Spectrum of Antibiotics
6.2.1 Mechanisms of Conventional Broad-spectrum Antibiotics and
Corresponding Resistance
In order to fight against the emergence of antibiotic resistance, we first need to familiarize ourselves with
the current status of the battle between pathogens and human race. In other words, we must have a general
understanding of how the conventional antibiotics work and how the corresponding antibiotic resistance
rises.
Figure 6.1: Di↵erent mechanisms of antibiotic resistance. After Ref. [19].
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Although the detailed mechanisms of conventional broad-spectrum antibiotics vary from class to class,
they kill bacteria by inhibition of essential bacterial functions. For example, penicillins inhibit cell wall syn-
thesis; tetracyclines inhibit protein synthesis; fluoroquinolones inhibit DNA synthesis; and rifampin inhibits
RNA synthesis [19]. By targeting essential bacterial functions, conventional antibiotics are able to e↵ectively
reduce bacteria population counts. Ironically, the use of antibiotics to disrupt normal bacterial metabolism
and reproduction imposes a severe selection pressure that causes rapid emergence of resistance genes in the
population. Antibiotic resistance genes code corresponding enzymes (Figure 6.1) functioning at di↵erent
levels [19, 4]. They may target at the antibiotic itself by destruction or inactivation. They may target the
transportation process by continual pumping out drugs. They may also target at the intracellular level by
target protection, target alternation, or bypassing an attacked metabolic step with a new drug-resistant
enzyme [19, 5]. For every class of antibiotics that targets an essential physiological function, a resistance
mechanism is now known (Table 6.1). Multidrug resistance is engendered either by the accumulation of mul-
tiple resistance genes, typically occurring on resistance plasmids, or the acquisition and increased expression
of genes coding some very powerful multidrug e✏ux pumps [205].
Table 6.1: Modes of resistance of commonly used antibiotics. After Ref. [4].
6.2.2 Restricting the Spectrum of Antibiotics
A single bacterium acquires antibiotic resistance genes through two pathways: mutation and horizontal gene
transfer. Generally speaking, mutation is a rare event, which depends on mutation rate and population size.
Horizontal gene transfer spreads antibiotic resistance genes intra- and inter-species and even across domains
[115]. A significant source of resistance genes for pathogens is the beneficial microbial population of the host,
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by virtue of its overwhelming population size and the relative ease of inter-species horizontal gene transfer.
Thus the rate of acquisition of resistance genes by the pathogen is dependent on the proportion of resistance
genes in the beneficial microbiota. When a broad-spectrum antibiotic is used, the impact on the beneficial
microbiota will be to select for a resistant sub-population, thus increasing the rate of transfer of resistance
genes from the beneficial microbiota to the pathogens. Concomitantly, any method to reduce the proportion
of resistance genes in the beneficial microbiota will significantly reduce the rate of transfer of such genes to
the pathogens. The best way to achieve this is to remove the selection pressure on the beneficial microbiota,
by the use of next-generation antibiotics with specific target species. A side benefit of this strategy is that
the pathogens must compete against a beneficial microbial population, whilst simultaneously being under
strong selection pressure from the antibiotic.
Bailing out beneficial microbiota from the application of conventional antibiotics will bring profound
impact on human health, probably more than what is established and justified currently. For example, it
is recognized [219, 220] that intestinal bacteria, such as Bacillus subtilis and Escherichia coli, synthesize
vitamin K, which is essential for human health. Besides their role as nutrition especially vitamin providers
and invasion protectors against pathogens, certain correlations between compositional shifts in beneficial
microbiota and long-term physiological changes have been suggested [184], such as association between erad-
icating Helicobacter pylori and increased risks of asthma and allergies [221]. Saving and reviving beneficial
microbiota may conduce not only to antibiotic resistance but also other public health problems such as
obesity [184].
Hence, the ideal scenario is to kill the specific pathogenic strains, but with no side e↵ect on the benefi-
cial microbiota. The latter can be either Gram-positive or Gram-negative strains, with the Gram-negatives
possessing an extra cell membrane that often blocks the influx of small molecules. Narrow-spectrum an-
tibiotics do not distinguish between pathogens and non-pathogens but are typically selective for either the
Gram-positive or Gram-negative bacteria. Here we use the term “ultra-narrow-spectrum antibiotics” to refer
to classes of antibiotic that a↵ect only the pathogens, as being developed by our collaborator Douglas A.
Mitchell. We show and compare the victims for di↵erent spectrum of antibiotics in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of antibiotics targeting di↵erent spectrums. Red crosses indicate victims.
6.3 Population Dynamics for Broad-, Narrow-, and
Ultra-Narrow Spectrum Antibiotics
6.3.1 Goal
In order to quantify the e↵ectiveness of restricting the range of antibiotics, we performed preliminary cal-
culations using an individual-level model of the population. In this calculation, the behavior and dynamics
of every organism is simulated, including birth-death processes, horizontal gene transfer, mutation and re-
source allocation within the community. Each bacterium, Gram-positive, Gram-negative or pathogenic, may
acquire the resistance gene by mutation or intra- or inter-species horizontal gene transfer.
We have studied both spatial homogeneity and heterogeneity, yielding qualitatively same results. With
the same initial conditions and biological measurable parameter settings, we would like to compare how
e↵ective it is in applying di↵erent antibiotics, and how rapid it is for the corresponding antibiotic resistance
to emerge, spread and dominate.
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6.3.2 Cost for Antibiotic Resistance
Usually there is a metabolic load associated with carrying antibiotic resistance genes [222, 5]. Such a
metabolic cost is strain- and gene-specific (Table 6.2), and subject to epistasis and environmental conditions,
with caveats that it might be cost-free in some rare cases [5] or shared among the whole bacterial community
[223].
Figure 6.3: Hungary’s penicillin consumption fell in over a decade. After Ref. [20].
The expensive biological cost for most antibiotic resistance strains inspires a ray of hope to revert
pathogens to drug sensitivity with reduced volume of antibiotic use. For example, penicillin-resistant pneu-
mococcus infections in Hungary [20] fell from 50% to 34% in over a decade’s reduced nationwide consumption
(Figure 6.3). Finland [21] decreed policies to regulate macrolide antibiotics consumption (Figure 6.4) and
documented erythromycin resistance from throat-swab and pus samples dropping from 16.5 % to 8.6 % in 5
years (Figure 6.5).
Surveillance and regulation of antibiotic usage seems to be e↵ective [224], but entails a long period
[225] to see a decline in resistance and requires further confirmation [226]. Taiwan, for instance, with
restricted antibiotic usage reported decreased resistance to penicillin, but not to erythromycin Streptococcus
pneumoniae from 1998 to 2003. More depressingly, UK reported [22] persistent sulphonamide resistance in
Escherichia coli, which was 39.7% in 1991 and 46.0% in 1999, despite drastic reduction in prescription of
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Table 6.2: Metabolic cost for antibiotic resistance is strain- and gene-specific. “Yes” indicates elongation in
generation time from several percent up to 400%. “Variable” indicates some mutations su↵er a cost while
some do not. After Ref. [5].
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Figure 6.4: Finland’s macrolide antibiotics consumption by outpatients from 1976 through 1995. Total
consumption decreased from 2.40 daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day in 1991 to 1.38 in 1992 and
remained low afterwards. After Ref. [21].
Figure 6.5: Finland’s erythromycin resistance from throat-swab and pus samples from 1990 through 1996.
The dashed line indicates unavailability of data in 1991. Erythromycin resistance among group A strepto-
coccal isolates dropped from 16.5 % in 1992 to 8.6 % in 1996. After Ref. [21].
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Figure 6.6: Switch of UK’s prescriptions from co-trimoxazole, which is a combination of sulphamethoxa-
zole and trimethoprim, to trimethoprim alone in the 1990s. Sulphonamide usage slumped from 320,000
prescriptions per year in 1991 to 7,000 in 1999. After Ref. [22].
Figure 6.7: Comparison of growth rates of VRSA-1 relative to susceptible MRSA strain HIP11713 between
non-induced (white) and induced (shaded and dotted) cultures. Fitness cost is nearly 40% for resistance but
dramatically drops to 3% without induction. White: brain heart infusion (BHI) broth without vancomycin.
Shaded: pregrown without vancomycin and subcultured with 1/50 the minimum inhibitory concentration
(MIC) of vancomycin. Dotted: pregrown and subcultured with 1/50 the MIC of vancomycin. After Ref.
[23].
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Table 6.3: Compensatory evolution ameliorates fitness cost of antibiotic resistance. Second site mutations
stabilizing resistance are more common compared with true reversion. After Ref. [5].
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nearly 80% over the 9-year period (Figure 6.6).
Epidemiological statistics are precious but it is hard to rely on them to establish sound correlations.
Genetic investigations leading by D.I. Andersson et al. [222, 227, 226, 228, 229, 5] expects true reversion
to drug sensitivity to be slow if not impossible for two reasons. First, compensatory evolution ameliorating
fitness cost together with cost-free resistance is able to fix antibiotic resistance. Table 6.3 shows that second
site mutations stabilizing resistance are more common compared with true reversion. More specifically, Ref.
[230] demonstrated that among 81 independent lineages of an rpsl gene mutation conferring streptomycin re-
sistance in Salmonella typhimurium, only 4 reverted while 77 lineages acquired compensatory mutations and
retained streptomycin resistance. Higher mutation rates and population bottlenecks together fix compen-
satory mutations instead of reversion [231]. Second, co-selection between resistance mechanisms and other
selected markers prevents potential reversion. Such a genetic linkage explained the persistent sulphonamide
resistance in UK in the 1990s as mentioned above [22].
Besides, the expensive metabolic cost is under regulation. M.L. Foucault et al. [23] demonstrated that the
fitness cost of the VanA-type glycopeptide resistance carried by clinical methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) isolates is 20% to 38% but shrinks to 0.4% to 3% without induction (Figure 6.7). The huge
reduction of metabolic cost in the absence of induction turns the vision of reduced resistance or reversion to
drug sensitive genotype with discreet and regulated antibiotic consumption more miserable.
We will circumvent all these complications in the metabolic cost and simply model it as a slightly lower
birth rate.
6.3.3 Methods
The real interactions in the micro-organismal world are complicated considering the huge population, myriad
species, and various mechanisms. The microbial population in the human gut, for example, on the order of
1014, outnumbers eukaryotic cells by an order of magnitude [232], covering over 1000 bacterial species with
at least 160 species for each individual [62], and engaging in dynamic interactions with profound implications
[233, 234]. As a minimal model, we regard all Gram-positive as a super strain, all Gram-negatives as another
one, and pathogens as the third. We consider intraspecies competition within Gram-positives and Gram-
negatives separately although competition between them exists in nature because, generally speaking, these
two coexist with each other and Gram-negatives have a larger population size than that of Gram-positives.
That is to say we allow a higher carrying capacity for Gram-negatives than for Gram-positives. We do not
impose a similar carrying capacity on pathogens so that they may burst and induce diseases. The beneficial
microbiota suppress the population of pathogens competing for limited resources and space such as the
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Figure 6.8: Flow chart of simulation steps to compare di↵erent spectrum of antibiotics.
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membrane.
For the purpose of making a caricature of the behavior of pathogens, there are two predetermined popu-
lation thresholds that govern the entire system behavior. The lower threshold marks the onset of the hosts
symptoms, at which point, a dose of antibiotics is taken, which kills a certain percent of pathogens deter-
mined by the killing rate. Whether Gram-positives and Gram-negatives su↵er at the same time depends on
the kind of antibiotics applied. Timely doses keep pathogens under good control unless antibiotic resistance
develops. The higher threshold indicates runaway proliferation of antibiotic resistant pathogens, or in other
words, the death of the host due to antibiotic resistance. Our goal is to investigate and thus compare the
emergence of antibiotic resistance for the new and conventional antibiotics when the higher threshold is
reached. There is a cost to carry the antibiotic resistance genes, which is modeled with a lower birth rate.
Each bacterium, either Gram-positive, Gram-negative or pathogenic, may acquire the resistance gene via
mutation or intra- or inter-species horizontal gene transfer. Generally inter-species horizontal gene transfer
rate is an order of magnitude larger than that of intra-species, while the latter is again an order of magnitude
larger than that of mutation.
Figure 6.8 sketches a flow chart of simulation procedures. Initially both Gram-positives and Gram-
negatives approach their carrying capacity, respectively, indicating balanced beneficial microbiota. The
population of pathogens is at the lower threshold to induce the first dose. When the clock starts to tick, the
following events occur. First a new dose is applied if the pathogenic population exceeds the lower threshold.
The survivors, if vulnerable, may mutate to gain antibiotic resistance. These resistance genes will transfer
horizontally both intra- and inter-species among vulnerable individuals. Every individual in the community
may reproduce and die according to their respective birth and death rate. The growth of the beneficial
microbiota is limited by their carrying capacity, and the birth of pathogens is suppressed by the beneficial
microbiota subject to their density. O↵spring of an antibiotic resistant parent maintain resistant. Then the
clock ticks again and the sequence of events restarts.
Real simulation code is provided in Appendix C.
6.3.4 Results and Discussions
First we would like to present simulation results in well-mixed populations. Figure 6.9 ⇠ Figure 6.11 show
the time evolution of the populations for Gram-positives, Gram-negatives, and pathogens, respectively, for
new and conventional antibiotics with the same initial conditions. The birth rate for the beneficial microbiota
without antibiotic resistance is 20% and drops to 10% for bearing the resistance genes, and the death rate
is 15%. The corresponding rates for pathogens are 60%, 50% and 0, respectively. The beneficial microbiota
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Figure 6.9: Time evolution for the total and resistant population of Gram-positives, Gram-negatives and
pathogens, respectively, using broad spectrum antibiotics.
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Figure 6.10: Time evolution for the total and resistant population of Gram-positives, Gram-negatives and
pathogens, respectively, using narrow spectrum antibiotics.
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Figure 6.11: Time evolution for the total and resistant population of Gram-positives, Gram-negatives and
pathogens, respectively, using ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics.
103
suppress 80% local birth of pathogens. Antibiotics kill 80% vulnerable species. The mutation rate to acquire
antibiotic resistance is 0.2%. Horizontal gene transfer rates for intra- and inter-species are 2% and 20%,
respectively. The lower threshold for the dose is 1000 while the higher for burst is 30000. All the simulations
start at time step 0. We can see that in Figure 6.9 for broad spectrum antibiotics, the first does is applied
at the time step 1, which kills the majority of Gram-positives, Gram-negatives, and pathogens. Later all the
three species recover their population with increased antibiotic resistance. At time step 1329, the second
dose is applied. Since almost all the pathogens are antibiotic resistant at this time, the only e↵ect is to
eradicate the beneficial microbiota, which releases the suppression pressure for pathogens and led to the
eventual burst. In Figure 6.10, the population of Gram-negative fluctuates around its carrying capacity, not
a↵ected by narrow spectrum antibiotics. The burst time almost doubles that in Figure 6.9. Figure 6.11 is the
simulation for ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics, where pathogens are always suppressed by the beneficial
microbiota. It takes a much longer time of about 4.5 times as that in the broad spectrum case for pathogens
to retrieve their population size and develop antibiotic resistance. By comparison, Figure 6.9 ⇠ Figure 6.11
illustrate the importance of the beneficial microbiota.
We run 3000 simulations of the population dynamics under three di↵erent treatments: broad-spectrum,
narrow-spectrum and ultra-narrow-spectrum but everything else is held constant in the simulations. We
observe a clear trend in the probability distribution of times (vertical axis in Figure 6.12) at which there
is runaway proliferation of resistant pathogens, compared across three classes of antibiotics. Figure 6.12
shows the statistics for the runaway time for broad-, narrow- and ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics, and the
mean runaway times (in system time steps) are 1374, 2783 and 5917, respectively. Significantly, the time for
runaway proliferation of resistant pathogens is increased by about half an order of magnitude through the
use of ultra-narrow-spectrum antibiotics, compared with current practice.
Including spatial inhomogeneity, Figure 6.13 presents statistics for the runaway time for broad-, narrow-
and ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics, and the mean runaway times (in system time steps) are 132, 459
and 1259, respectively. Here we run 500 simulations for each case with the same parameter settings as the
non-spatial version. Each individual di↵uses randomly with average di↵usion length 4 during each time
step on a 257 ⇥ 257 lattice with periodic boundary conditions. In the spatial version here the time for
runaway proliferation of resistant pathogens is increased by nearly an order of magnitude through the use
of ultra-narrow-spectrum antibiotics in comparison with the broad-spectrum antibiotics. Comparing Figure
6.12 and Figure 6.13, we can see that spatial and non-spatial models yield qualitatively the same result.
This preliminary result suggests that we can meaningfully expand the window during which the next-
generation antibiotics will be e↵ective through the use of targeted strategies. However, even these strategies
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Figure 6.12: In the spatial homogeneous model, frequency VS onset time for runaway proliferation of resistant
pathogens for di↵erent types of antibiotics. The mean onset times for broad, narrow and ultra-narrow
spectrum antibiotics are 1374, 2783 and 5917, respectively, showing half an order of magnitude improvement.
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Figure 6.13: In the spatial inhomogeneous model, frequency VS onset time for runaway proliferation of
resistant pathogens for di↵erent types of antibiotics. The mean onset times for broad, narrow and ultra-
narrow spectrum antibiotics are 132, 459 and 1259, respectively, showing nearly an order of magnitude
improvement.
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eventually result in the emergence of antibiotic resistance. In order to break the paradigm of antimicrobials
inevitably leading to emergence of resistance, we need to use a strategy that goes beyond the simple direct
conflicts that bacteria use between themselves for antagonistic interactions. What is more, as Lee et al. [223]
pointed out, bacteria may share antibiotic resistant products, which exempts the cost to carry the resistance
genes for every bacterium. The cooperative behavior among bacteria exacerbates human’s condition in the
arms race. It calls for ideal antibiotics with no resistance.
6.4 Quorum Sensing Spoofing
6.4.1 Reducing Selection Pressure by Community E↵ect
In the above plan for the new antibiotics, we successfully extend the time scale for the emergence of antibiotic
resistance. However, we see that the conventional method of disturbing essential bacterial functions, although
e cient in bacterial elimination, also imposes such an intensive selection pressure that resulted in rapid
resistance. Aiming at the design of next generation of antibiotics with presumably no resistance, we need to
reconcile the conflict between e↵ective decimation and small selection pressure.
Generally speaking, disease is caused not by a single pathogenic bacterium or a small group, but by
the bacterial community as a whole. It is very expensive for a small population of pathogens to express
toxins, as this may trigger a response by beneficial microbiota and the immune system. Thus, in order to
coordinate the expression of virulence, bacteria ubiquitously employ a cell-to-cell communication mechanism
called quorum sensing (whose details di↵er between Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria), in which
a signaling molecule known as an autoinducer is produced by the bacteria, and whose concentration is
e↵ectively monitored by the bacteria [235]. When the population is small, autoinducers released by cells
quickly di↵use away and dilute. Thus the cells will receive little feedback from the environment. When
the population is large, enough signaling molecules, either imported into the cells or received by receptors
at the cell membrane, will initiate the transcription of target genes for mid/late stage virulence factors
(often toxins). Su cient expression of virulence factors causes disease. This suggests that in order to
keep the total expression of virulence factors under control, one does not necessarily need to invoke high
selection pressure on the bacterial community, thus potentially avoiding antibiotic resistance. One promising
approach is to block the reception of cognate autoinducers [215, 216, 217, 218] but mutation against blockage
has recently been reported in experiments [236]. Thus, we propose an even more innovative approach, which
we call Quorum Sensing Spoofing (QSS). Our seemingly counter-intuitive goal is to promote the premature
expression of virulence factors.
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6.4.2 Quorum Sensing Spoofing (QSS)
Quorum sensing is essential in bacterial communication to monitor population density. By coordinating
the expression of virulence factors, bacteria can share the cost of toxin production and can prevail against
competitors for their niche, but this is only an e↵ective strategy for them once their population is su ciently
large. If their population is small, the host’s defenses are able to defeat the infection. Thus, we propose to
force the pre-expression of virulence factors by adding autoinducers when the bacterial population is still
small. Bacteria are spoofed by their own quorum sensing mechanism when they detect high enough density
of autoinducers. Expressing virulence when the actual population is still small is a huge cost to a cell and
exposes it to attack from the surrounding microbiota and the host immune system. In this way bacteria
su↵er from delayed growth due to the metabolic load of pre-expression of virulence factors.
Let us emphasize three points. First, QSS will work because we spoof bacteria into choosing the wrong
strategy by pre-expressing virulence when the population size is still small. This is something that intrin-
sically they try to avoid and quorum sensing presumably evolved to avoid making this bad choice. Second,
QSS is a safe treatment, because the total bacterial population is small enough that the overall level of
virulence is small. Third, QSS is not expected to induce resistance because, contrary to the conventional
paradigm, it does not add any alien molecules or chemical compounds. What we add are autoinducers
already present in the environment. Thus, bacteria will continue to undergo their normal metabolism, but
their wrong choice of pre-expression leads them to a dead end.
6.4.3 Methods
Here we would like to show our individual-level simulations of how the QSS strategy would work on a model
microbial community. We do not di↵erentiate beneficial microbiota into Gram-positives or Gram-negatives.
We consider intra-species competition and the suppression from local beneficial microbiota toward pathogens
due to limited resources and space. Pathogens expressing virulence factors grow at a much lower birth rate
than usual as a cost for virulence. Each cell will produce and release autoinducers into the environment,
which will di↵use around and hydrolyze after some time. Cells sensing enough autoinducers within a certain
period will express virulence. We manually set up two thresholds for pathogenic population in the simulation.
The lower threshold is the time to take a dose, when extra autoinducers are added for enforced expression of
virulence. The higher threshold is the time the disease develops, which is the actual threshold for pathogens
to express virulence.
Figure 6.14 sketches a flow chart of simulation procedures for QSS. We run the simulation on a two-
dimensional lattice to include spatial inhomogeneity. The initial population of the beneficial microbiota
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Figure 6.14: Flow chart of simulation steps for QSS.
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approaches their carrying capacity and that of the pathogens is a little away from the lower threshold for
dose. When the clock ticks, a sequence of events occurs. The community di↵uses over the lattice. Each
individual may reproduce and die according to their birth and death rates. The birth of the beneficial
microbiota is limited by the carrying capacity while that of pathogens is suppressed by the local density of
the beneficial microbiota. If the population of pathogens exceeds the lower threshold, a dose is applied for
spoofing. All the autoinducers, either manually added or produced by pathogens, di↵use around for a while
before hydrolization. Pathogens detecting enough autoinducers express virulence and then grow at a lower
birth rate. If the population of pathogens expressing virulence surpasses the higher threshold for disease,
the host is killed and the simulation stops. Otherwise, the clock ticks on.
6.4.4 Results and Discussions
We show the simulation results running on a 257⇥ 257 lattice for Quorum Sensing Spoofing in Figure 6.15.
The birth and death rates for the beneficial microbiota are 20% and 15%, respectively. The birth rate for
pathogens not expressing virulence is 50%, which slumps to 5% for expression, and their death rate is 3%.
The beneficial microbiota suppress 30% local birth of pathogens. The lower threshold for dose is 1200 and
the higher for disease is 4500. As a comparison, in the upper panel, when no treatment is given, pathogens
coordinate their expression of virulence at about 19 time steps, thus initiating a disease state in the host.
In the lower panel, with QSS treatment, the majority of the pathogen population is forced to express their
virulence far below the higher threshold of disease. Then the population steadily falls below the lower
threshold and the treatment is stopped. Following the cessation of treatment, the pathogen population
revives, thus initiating another cycle of treatment. Note that the pathogen population remains bounded for
arbitrary long times. Actually we have run the simulation for much longer time steps where the population
of pathogens is always under good control.
Hitherto we have demonstrated Quorum Sensing Spoofing as a safe and e↵ective antibiotic strategy. The
highlight is that it will not cause antibiotic resistance because no alien molecules are introduced and we do
not disturb bacterial metabolism, such as replication, regulation or gene expression processes. The strategy
is robust to details but has two caveats. It should not be used if the pathogen population is already close to
the higher threshold where pathogenesis would naturally occur, in which case, QSS will be a fatal disaster.
It should not be used when the pathogen population is so small that the drug is diluted and time wastes
waiting for the slow drop of pathogenic population in an exponential form as shown in Figure 6.16, where
the lower threshold shrinks to 0.
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Figure 6.15: Time development of pathogen population (vertical axis). Upper panel: wild. As a control,
without QSS disease develops at time step 19. Lower panel: QSS employed. Using QSS, the population of
pathogens is always under control. No disease is detected.
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Figure 6.16: Decrease of pathogenic population follows an exponential form.
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6.5 Drug Combination
6.5.1 Quorum Sensing Spoofing + Ultra-Narrow Spectrum Antibiotics
QSS is a promising strategy but there are two potential problems. The first is: from a clinical standpoint,
when is the best time to take the first dose? When a patient su↵ers from some symptoms, the population
of pathogens might already have reached the higher threshold, when is dangerous to take any extra autoin-
ducers. The second is: how to improve its e ciency when the pathogen population is small? Naturally, if
treatment is stopped, the pathogens will begin to regrow their population. Thus, there is a danger that the
patient may end up with “QSS addiction”.
To solve these two problems, we propose to combine ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics with Quorum
Sensing Spoofing. To see if this can be e↵ective, we performed preliminary simulations of this strategy, as
before but now we allow mutation to generate resistance genes against ultra-narrow antibiotics, but of course
no resistance against the quorum sensing signaling molecules. We checked (1) the e↵ect of drug combination
and (2) emergence of antibiotic resistance against ultra-narrow antibiotics.
6.5.2 Methods
This time we will have five thresholds as shown in Figure 6.17. From the highest to the lowest, the first
threshold h4 is the population of pathogens above which the host is killed due to proliferation. The second
threshold h3 is the population at which there is detection of symptoms of the infection, above which the
patient will take a dose of ultra-narrow antibiotics in order to reduce the population of pathogens below
threshold h2. Then the patient will change to QSS till threshold h1, when QSS loses e ciency. Regime
h1 ⇠ h2 is safe and e cient for QSS as we discussed earlier. Ideally, we want regime h1 ⇠ h2 as large as
possible. Below h1, we switch back to ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics to eradicate the pathogen e ciently.
Threshold h0 is the lower bound for treatment, below which no medicine will be taken.
Figure 6.17: Di↵erent thresholds important for the combination strategy of QSS + ultra-narrow spectrum
antibiotics.
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The simulation procedures are roughly the same as the model for Quorum Sensing Spoofing except the
selection of antibiotics according to the pathogenic population.
6.5.3 Results and Discussions
Figure 6.18: A treatment cycle for drug combination for h0 = 0. The red line indicates total population
while the blue line indicates pathogens expressing virulence factors.
We show a full treatment cycle in Figure 6.18 with the following set of parameters: h0 = 0, h1 = 500,
h2 = 2500, h3 = 3000, h4 = 4500, the killing rate of the ultra-narrow antibiotics is 40% while mutation rate
equals 0.02% and intra-species horizontal gene transfer rate 2%. We can see that drug combination works
e↵ectively and safely. To investigate the emergence of resistance against ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics,
we tune h0 to a nonzero (100) value keeping else the same, and show the simulation in Figure 6.19. We can
see that not only the total population of pathogens is always small and under good control, but also that
of resistant pathogens is always small and negligible even the time steps increase by an order of magnitude.
Hence we are led to the hypothesis that motivates our in vitro and in vivo proposed research: combining
Quorum Sensing Spoofing with ultra-narrow antibiotics appears to be e↵ective in suppressing the emergence
and spread of resistance genes, and o↵ers a safe and e↵ective treatment strategy.
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Figure 6.19: A treatment cycle for drug combination for h0 = 100. The red line indicates total population
while the blue line indicates pathogens expressing virulence factors.
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6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate non-conventional antibiotics and their treatment. Recognizing the huge
importance and visible and hidden benefits of the beneficial microbiota [184], we narrow down the victims in
antibiotic treatment. Compared with conventional antibiotics, where Gram-positives, Gram-negatives and
pathogens all su↵er, narrow and especially ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics show long delayed emergence
of resistance.
We design a brand new strategy naming Quorum Sensing Spoofing. Adding extra autoinducers, we
successfully spoof bacteria to pre-express their virulence and thus su↵er from the burden of pre-expression.
QSS highlights no antibiotic resistance.
Last we propose a treatment plan combining ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics and Quorum Sensing
Spoofing. The basic idea is to take full advantage of Quorum Sensing Spoof and extend the treatment
regime and increase the e ciency by switching to ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics. We can achieve safety
and e ciency in treatment. Furthermore, emergence of resistance against ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics
is highly reduced by alternating drugs.
With the rise in antibiotic resistance and the lack of financial incentive for large pharmaceutical compa-
nies to pursue novel antibiotics, humankind risks losing the fight against bacterial pathogens. Despite their
apparent success, conventional and proposed antibiotics su↵er from a fundamental drawback: all existing
antibiotics target essential life processes of bacteria, such as translation or cell wall biosynthesis, and thus
represent the ultimate selective pressure for an organism. The distinguishing aspect of our research philos-
ophy is this: future antibiotics should not target essential metabolic pathways but instead directly target
key aspects of the pathogenic mechanism. Our research will exhibit no e↵ects on primary metabolism, be-
cause in our proposed strategies it is communication systems and collective properties of a community that
are hijacked and repurposed. By limiting our treatment to those bacteria that are actively causing disease
(i.e. biosynthesizing toxins and actively subverting our immune systems), our approach of quorum sensing
spoofing followed by ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics significantly limits the number of targeted bacteria.
Thus, the clinical shelf life of the antimicrobial drug is extended. Moreover, this anti-virulence strategy
preserves the symbiotic bacteria that play a vital role in human physiology and compete against pathogens.




In this dissertation, I presented my discoveries and innovations in the population dynamics of virus-host
systems, social life of micro-organisms, evolutionary game theory, and medicine.
I derived a mean-field theory for the population dynamics of viruses and their hosts. I identified a novel
limit cycle robust to fluctuations in the presence of lysogeny, which manifests and recognizes lysogens’ role
as a genetic reservoir. Such a cycle can be tested in experiments.
In the social life of budding yeast, I proposed a theory of cooperation directly linking game theory
and experimental measurable quantities. The methods can be used in the design of future experiments to
manipulate collective properties of micro-organism communities.
In evolutionary game theory, I invented a novel mechanism with biological interpretations to explain the
ubiquitous cooperation in biology. The dominance of cooperators in the model is independent of the detailed
rules.
Perhaps the most practically useful piece of my thesis work is the application of population dynamics to
medicine. First, I verified the e↵ectiveness to slow down the rapid emergence of antibiotic resistance with
narrow-spectrum and especially ultra-narrow-spectrum antibiotics. Last but not last, I invented a brand new
scheme of Quorum Sensing Spoofing, which may guide the next generation of antibiotics. I also designed
candidate treatment cycles combining Quorum Sensing Spoofing with ultra-narrow spectrum antibiotics.
The schemes will be tested in laboratory.
7.1 Thoughts and Reflections
It is recognized that biology provides physics with the second law of thermodynamics while physics provides
biology with microscopy. In exchange for a law with an instrument, is physics too mean?
Walking through the same forest, physicists may tend to appreciate the similarities between di↵erent
trees while biologists probably would like to study the trees one by one, or even leaf by leaf.
Physics, generally speaking, tackles universal phenomena such as phase transitions. It is the strength
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of physicists to find simple and unifying explanations for complicated phenomena. In biology, there also
exist universal phenomena such as coexistence and cooperation as I mentioned in this dissertation. Hence
methods and approaches in physics might contribute to these universal problems in biology, too.
Biological interactions are usually so complicated that it requires large e↵ort to measure and quantify
the system. Focusing on detailed and specific systems for a long time, sometimes people tend to lose and
forget the big picture. Besides due to experimental restrictions some experimental data are hard to obtain
such as data on evolutionary and ecological timescales. Once in a while it helps to sit back and see the big
picture such as evolution and ecology. It is the job of physics to remind and ask biology the real important
questions, e.g., the origin of life.
Di↵erent disciplines are divided so that time and e↵ort can be focused on the specific branch of problem.
However as long as a problem is solved, it does not matter what branch of knowledge is used. Sometimes
jumping across branches may o↵er panorama of the whole forest. The di↵erences and similarities between
di↵erent branches may become clearer so that one can ask the right and important questions.
Besides, interdisciplinary research may help to bring new ideas. For example, my idea of Quorum Sensing
Spoofing is intrinsically simple. As Nigel commented, it should have been proposed years ago, but was not.
Coming to the field of medicine as an outlier, I am not restricted to the routine methods in search of new
antibiotics. What is more, I am equipped with analytical tools and simulation skills that help to solve the
problem. More importantly, trained as a physicist, the way of thinking, reasoning and tackling problems
will all help to broaden the horizon, which might be the key in interdisciplinary research.
Furthermore, important questions across disciplines may share some kind of similarity such as cooperation
in game theory and in biology. Another example I would like emphasize is irreversibility. Irreversibility breaks
the symmetry of time, which is essentially important in physics. The question in biology is irreversibility
in evolution. Current research on antibiotic resistance suggests that in most cases acquisition of antibiotic
resistance genes is irreversible, which means that strains tend to have second site mutations to mediate the
cost for antibiotic resistance instead of reverting to antibiotic sensitivity in the absent of antibiotics. What is
the criterion for reversibility and irreversibility in biology? Once found, we human may have more confidence
against not only antibiotics but also cancers.
I hope one day we can say that biology rewards physics with the second law of thermodynamics while
physics rewards biology with the origin of life.
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Appendix A
Transition Matrices for the Lysis-only
Model
Here we provide the transition matrices, which are the probabilities for the change in the population in each
time step in the lysis-only model.
T (m+ 1, n|m,n) = bµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2m (K  m)







eb = 2bµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K   1
⇡ 2bµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K
. (A.2)
T (m  1, n|m,n) = cµ (1  ⌫)!m
K
+ dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) m (m  1)












ec = cµ (1  ⌫)!
K
, (A.4)
ed = dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K   1
⇡ dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K
. (A.5)
T (m  1, n+ ↵  1|m,n) = eµ⌫ (1  !) 2m (K  m)










e= 2eµ⌫ (1  !)
(K   1)W
⇡ 2eµ⌫ (1  !)
KW
. (A.7)
T (m  1, n+     1|m,n) = fµ⌫ (1  !) m (m  1)







ef = fµ⌫ (1  !)
(K   1)W
⇡ fµ⌫ (1  !)
KW
. (A.9)
T (m,n  1|m,n) = g (1  µ) ⌫ n
W
= egn, (A.10)
eg = (1  µ) ⌫
W
. (A.11)
All the other transition matrixes are zero. Noting that all the events in Table 2.2 are Markov processes,
we know that the time evolution for the probability with m hosts and n phages at time t will be
d
dt
P (m,n, t) = T (m,n|m  1, n)P (m  1, n, t)
+ T (m,n|m+ 1, n)P (m+ 1, n, t)
+ T (m,n|m+ 1, n+ ↵  1)P (m+ 1, n+ ↵  1, t)
+ T (m,n|m+ 1, n+     1)P (m+ 1, n+     1, t)
+ T (m,n|m,n+ 1)P (m,n+ 1, t)
  [T (m+ 1, n|m,n) + T (m  1, n|m,n)
+ T (m  1, n+ ↵  1|m,n) + T (m  1, n+     1|m,n)
+ T (m,n  1|m,n)]P (m  1, n, t) . (A.12)
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Applying summations according to Eq. (2.3), we will get
d hmi
dt
= hT (m+ 1, n|m,n)i   hT (m  1, n|m,n)i
  hT (m  1, n+ ↵  1|m,n)i





























= (↵  1) hT (m  1, n+ ↵  1|m,n)i
+ (    1) hT (m  1, n+     1|m,n)i
  hT (m,n  1|m,n)i











  eg hni . (A.13b)
Let
r = eb+ ed, (A.14a)
  = e, (A.14b)
  = ↵  1, (A.14c)
dm = ec+ ed, (A.14d)





(    1) ef
(↵  1) e, (A.14g)
which is Eq. (2.6), we can arrive at Eq. (2.5).
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Appendix B
Transition Matrices for the
Lysogeny-lysis Model
In this appendix, we provide details for the derivations of the lysogeny-lysis model.
According to Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, we can obtain the following non-zero transition matrixes:
T (m+ 1, s, n|m, s, n) = bµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2m (K  m  s)







eb = 2bµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K   1
⇡ 2bµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K
. (B.2)
T (m, s+ 1, n|m, s, n) = bµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2s (K  m  s)







T (m  1, s, n|m, s, n) = cµ (1  ⌫)!m
K
+ dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) m (m  1)




dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2ms
K (K   1)
= ecm+ edmm+ s
K
, (B.4)
ec = cµ (1  ⌫)!
K
, (B.5)
ed = dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K   1
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⇡ dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K
. (B.6)
T (m, s  1, n|m, s, n) = cµ (1  ⌫)! s
K
+ dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) s (s  1)




dµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2ms
K (K   1)
= ecs+ edsm+ s
K
. (B.7)
T (m  1, s, n+ ↵+ 1|m, s, n) = eµ⌫ (1  !) 2m (K  m  s)









e= 2eµ⌫ (1  !)
(K   1)W
⇡ 2eµ⌫ (1  !)
KW
. (B.9)
T (m  1, s, n+   + 1|m, s, n) = fµ⌫ (1  !) m (m  1)
K (K   1)
n
W
+ fµ⌫ (1  !) 2ms






ef = fµ⌫ (1  !)
(K   1)W
⇡ fµ⌫ (1  !)
KW
. (B.11)
T (m  1, s+ 1, n  1|m, s, n) = hµ⌫ (1  !) 2m (K  m  s)
K (K   1)
n
W
+ kµ⌫ (1  !) m (m  1)
K (K   1)
n
W
+ kµ⌫ (1  !) 2ms












eh = 2hµ⌫ (1  !)
(K   1)W
⇡ 2hµ⌫ (1  !)
KW
, (B.13)
ek = kµ⌫ (1  !)
(K   1)W
⇡ kµ⌫ (1  !)
KW
. (B.14)
T (m, s  1, n+ ↵|m, s, n) = pµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2s (K  m  s)







ep = 2pµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K   1
⇡ 2pµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K
. (B.16)
T (m, s  1, n+  |m, s, n) = qµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) s (s  1)
K (K   1)
+ qµ (1  ⌫) (1  !) 2ms




eq = qµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K   1
⇡ qµ (1  ⌫) (1  !)
K
. (B.18)
T (m, s, n  1|m, s, n) = g (1  µ) ⌫ n
W
= egn, (B.19)
eg = (1  µ) ⌫
W
. (B.20)
Ignoring fluctuations and correlations, we derive the populations dynamics at the mean field level. The
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time evolution for population size is
d hmi
dt
= hT (m+ 1, s, n|m, s, n)i   hT (m  1, s, n|m, s, n)i   hT (m  1, s, n+ ↵  1|m, s, n)i
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= (↵  1) hT (m  1, s, n+ ↵  1|m, s, n)i+ (    1) hT (m  1, s, n+     1|m, s, n)i
  hT (m  1, s+ 1, n  1|m, s, n)i+ ↵ hT (m, s  1, n+ ↵|m, s, n)i+   hT (m, s  1, n+  |m, s, n)i
  hT (m, s, n  1|m, s, n)i
=
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1  (    1)
ef   ek




1  2 · (    1)
ef   ek



















  eg hni . (B.21c)
Let
r = eb+ ed, (B.22a)
d1 = ec+ ed, (B.22b)
d2 = ep, (B.22c)
d3 = eg, (B.22d)
 1 = e+ eh, (B.22e)














(    1) ef   ek





which is Eq. (3.4), and omit angle-brackets for simplicity, Eq. (B.21) can be written as Eq. (3.3).
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Appendix C
Simulation Code of Population
Dynamics for Broad-, Narrow-, and
Ultra-Narrow Spectrum Antibiotics
Here I provide working code written in C++ for the simulation described in Section 6.3.3.
// : Anti11 . cpp
// output time e vo l u t i on o f popu la t i on o f Gram p o s i t i v e s ,




#include <c s t d l i b>
#include <cmath>
#include ” r e qu i r e . h”
using namespace std ;
// se tup g l o b a l cons tan t s
const bool ki l lGP = 0 ; // k i l l Gram p o s i t i v e s
const bool kil lGN = 0 ; // k i l l Gram nega t i v e s
const double mBL = 0 . 1 ; // microbe b i r t h low
const double mBH = 0 . 2 ; // microbe b i r t h high
const double mD = 0 . 1 5 ; // microbe death
const double mS = 0 . 8 ; // microbe suppres s ion
const double pBL = 0 . 5 ; // pathogen b i r t h low
const double pBH = 0 . 6 ; // pathogen b i r t h high
const double pD = 0 ; // pathogen death
const double dK = 0 . 8 ; // drug k i l l
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const double mutation = 0 . 0 0 2 ; // mutation ra t e
const double HGTintra = 0 . 0 2 ; // HGT i n t r a s p e c i e s
const double HGTinter = 0 . 2 ; // HGT i n t e r s p e c i e s
const long tDose = 1000 ; // th re sho l d dose
const long tBurst = 30000; // th re sho l d bu r s t
const long kUT = 4e5 ; // un i t carry ing capac i t y
const long kGP = 6e5 ; // carry ing capac i t y o f Gram p o s i t i v e s
const long kGN = 8e5 ; // carry ing capac i t y o f Gram nega t i v e s
long hours ; // time s t ep
long popGP, popGN, popP , popRGP, popRGN, popRP ;
void setup ( ){
hours = 0 ;
popGP = kGP;
popGN = kGN;
popP = tDose ;
popRGP = 0 ;
popRGN = 0 ;
popRP = 0 ;
}
long gen ( long n , double r a t e ){
long r = 0 ;
for ( long i = 0 ; i < n ; ++i )
i f ( (double ) rand ( ) / (double )RANDMAX < r a t e ) ++r ;
return r ;
}
void k i l l ( ){
i f (popP >= tDose ){
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popP  = gen (popP   popRP , dK) ;
i f ( k i l lGP ) popGP  = gen (popGP   popRGP, dK) ;
i f ( ki l lGN ) popGN  = gen (popGN   popRGN, dK) ;
}
}
void mutate ( ){
popRP += gen (popP   popRP , mutation ) ;
i f ( k i l lGP ) popRGP += gen (popGP   popRGP, mutation ) ;
i f ( ki l lGN ) popRGN += gen (popGN   popRGN, mutation ) ;
}
void r eproduce he lp ( long& n1 , long& n2 , double rate1 , double ra t e2 ){
long x = gen ( n1   n2 , ra t e1 ) ;
long y = gen (n2 , ra t e2 ) ;
n2 += y ;
n1 += x + y ;
}
void reproduce ( ){
double s r = pow( (double )1   mS, (double ) (popGP + popGN) / (double )kUT) ;
double c1 = (double )kGP / (double )popGP ;
double c2 = (double )kGN / (double )popGN;
reproduce he lp (popP , popRP , s r ⇤ pBH, s r ⇤ pBL ) ;
r eproduce he lp (popGP, popRGP, c1 ⇤ mBH, c1 ⇤ mBL) ;
r eproduce he lp (popGN, popRGN, c2 ⇤ mBH, c2 ⇤ mBL) ;
}
void hgt ( ){
long iP = 0 , iGP = 0 , iGN = 0 ;
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iP = gen (popRP , HGTintra ) ;
i f ( k i l lGP ){
iGP = gen (popRGP, HGTintra ) ;
iP += gen (popRGP, HGTinter ) ;
iGP += gen (popRP , HGTinter ) ;
}
i f ( ki l lGN ){
iGN = gen (popRGN, HGTintra ) ;
iP += gen (popRGN, HGTinter ) ;
iGN += gen (popRP , HGTinter ) ;
}
i f ( k i l lGP && kil lGN ){
iGP += gen (popRGN, HGTintra ) ;
iGN += gen (popRGP, HGTintra ) ;
}
// cout << iP << ” ” << iGP << ” ” << iGN << end l ;
popRP += min( iP , popP   popRP ) ;
i f ( k i l lGP ) popRGP += min( iGP , popGP   popRGP) ;
i f ( ki l lGN ) popRGN += min(iGN , popGN   popRGN) ;
}
void s u r v i v e h e l p ( long& n1 , long& n2 , double r a t e ){
long x = gen ( n1   n2 , r a t e ) ;
long y = gen (n2 , r a t e ) ;
n2  = y ;
n1  = x + y ;
}
void su rv iv e ( ){
s u r v i v e h e l p (popP , popRP , pD) ;
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s u r v i v e h e l p (popGP, popRGP, mD) ;
s u r v i v e h e l p (popGN, popRGN, mD) ;
}
int main ( int argc , char⇤ argv [ ] ) {
const char⇤ f i d = argc > 1 ? argv [ 1 ] : ”01” ;
s t r i n g fname ( ”Anti11 . dat” ) ;
fname . i n s e r t (7 , f i d ) ;
o f s t ream out ( fname . c s t r ( ) ) ;
a s su r e ( out , fname . c s t r ( ) ) ;
out << ” ki l lGP ” << ki l lGP << endl ;
out << ”ki l lGN ” << kil lGN << endl ;
out << ”mBL ” << mBL << endl ;
out << ”mBH ” << mBH << endl ;
out << ”mD ” << mD << endl ;
out << ”mS ” << mS << endl ;
out << ”pBL ” << pBL << endl ;
out << ”pBH ” << pBH << endl ;
out << ”pD ” << pD << endl ;
out << ”dK ” << dK << endl ;
out << ”mutation ” << mutation << endl ;
out << ”HGTintra ” << HGTintra << endl ;
out << ”HGTinter ” << HGTinter << endl ;
out << ” tDose ” << tDose << endl ;
out << ” tBurst ” << tBurst << endl ;
out << ”kUT ” << kUT << endl ;
out << ”kGP ” << kGP << endl ;
out << ”kGN ” << kGN << endl ;
srand ( time ( 0 ) ) ;
setup ( ) ;
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out << ”\nhours\tpopGP\tpopRGP\tpopGN\tpopRGN\tpopP\tpopRP\n” ;
out << ”START\n” ;
out << hours << ”\ t ” << popGP << ”\ t ” << popRGP << ”\ t ”
<< popGN << ”\ t ” << popRGN << ”\ t ” << popP << ”\ t ”
<< popRP << endl ;
while (popP < tBurst ){
hours++;
k i l l ( ) ;
mutate ( ) ;
reproduce ( ) ;
hgt ( ) ;
su rv iv e ( ) ;
out << hours << ”\ t ” << popGP << ”\ t ” << popRGP << ”\ t ”
<< popGN << ”\ t ” << popRGN << ”\ t ” << popP << ”\ t ”
<< popRP << endl ;
}
// out << ”END\n” ;
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